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ABSTRACT
Official Defense Department doctrine ties the determination of per-
formance requirements for new classes of surface warships directly to
demonstrated operational needs. A close review of procurement policies
indicates that final ship characteristics are actually the result of a
number of pressures, biases, and arbitrary decisions - a process which
is generally divorced from objective analysis, and is based primarily
upon political considerations.
Consensus among ship designers and operators favors development of
surface platforms primarily optimized to identified mission requirements.
Attempts by the Navy to develop such a capability and primary factors
which have inhibited such a procurement strategy are examined in detail.
The immense and disjointed structure of the ship acquisition organi-
zation, and the continued inability of the Navy to develop adequate meas-
sures of effectiveness for entire ship systems are the primary obstacles
to the development of a design and procurement process optimized to spe-
cific operational requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
The combatant surface ship is one of the most complex systems man has
ever attempted to design, produce, and operate. To achieve an optimum combi-
nation of combat, control, and habitability subsystems for the minimum cost
continues to be a near monumental problem for the ship designer. In recent
decades this problem has grown in proportion to the explosion of weapons
systems and platform technology that has easily priced the most sophisticated
vessels out of consideration. Exacerbating this situation is the irrevoca-
bility of many of the initial design decisions resulting from an inability
to test and evaluate the resulting ship prior to the full-scale production
decision. Clearly the analysis that generates the final design is critical
to producing a unit that will satisfy operational requirements some five to
ten years in the future - and will be adequate for accepting modification
to fulfill fleet needs in excess of 30 years after commissioning.
In the past two decades the Navy has gone through two major procurement
concepts, and is moving toward a third, in what has largely been an unsuccess-
ful effort to optimize surface ship performance within some cost constraint.
Under stated development practices, the determination of combat system con-
figuration for surface ships involves a long analytical and iterative process
to fit a combat vessel into an established mission requirement, while remain-
ing within imposed cost constraints (i.e. "fitting a ship to a mission").
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (OP-03) is charged
with establishing force requirements and delineating specific needs, constraints,
and other design criteria to design offices in the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA). OP-03 initiates studies and receives analytical support from a
variety of agencies involved with combat systems development, operational
test and evaluation, tactical development and evaluation, and force level/
force mix systems analysis (see Figure I). Through iterative dialogue with
NAVSEA, a product is hammered out that is supposed to represent the best pos-
sible answer to fleet needs in the identified warfare areas.
In reality, a final ship design is the product of a large number of inputs,
pressures, and constraints - many of which can be predicted even prior to
conception, and most of which are entirely independent of any analytical process.
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Figure I. The Surface Warship Design Process
As a result, it is usually not until after a combat ship enters the fleet
that serious consideration is given to its mission, that operational defi-
ciencies are noted, and that programs are initiated and funded to enable it
to carry out assigned tasks.
Minimum unit production cost for a low capability ship currently exceeds
$250 million a copy (exclusive of approved but uninstalled modifications).
With growing questions in the Department of Defense and Congress about the
operational validity of surface combatants in the next century, the Navy
has reached a point where program funding has become increasingly tied to
"proof" of platform need and operational effectiveness. The inability to
provide such quantitative proof has made program validity easily questionable,
and continues to keep major decisions of program direction out of Navy hands
altogether.
The objective of this study is to describe the Navy's ship design process
and analyze the critical decisions of platform and payload determination at
each step of their development. The severe limitations of attempting to
"fit" a notional ship into a set of expected operational scenarios is recog-
nized, but it is clear that the ship development system as it exists does
not generate a product that is oriented or optimized toward any set parameters
of mission effectiveness. The idealized process of relating specific ship
missions to operational scenarios in an overall national security strategy
has been termed a "dreamworld" approach by many Navy designers and analysts.
Yet this is a dreamworld that continues to be propagated by the molding and
modification of the developmental process and design-related documents to
fit into that established framework. Such an analytical framework also lends
itself to long range planning and budget justification, yet it has not
proven to be particularly effective in either role.
The critical failing is not that the Navy doesn't design good ships, but
that prior to fleet introduction, no one really knows how good those ships
are - or whether they are what the fleet really needs.
Section I of this study is a broad overview of the current ship procure-
ment process in the Department of Defense. It reflects the "official" doc-
trine of how major ship construction programs are presently identified,
initiated, and molded to fulfill specific operational needs. The section
represents the "ideal" of how ships are designed into identified mission
requirements.
Sections IIA and IIB trace the design and development processes that
produced the Navy's latest two classes of ocean escort - the DD-963 and
the FFG-7. These are particularly pertinent since each project developed
new acquisition policies intended to overcome past procurement deficiencies
and to maximize performance within acceptable cost constraints. The objec-
tive for studying each ship program is to demonstrate the actual detachment
of analytical procedure from the requirements derivation and design process.
In each case the primary configuration decisions were based on constrained
criteria only subjectively related to performance. Section IIC reviews
current ship development programs to provide an overview of the current
direction of ongoing ship design projects and procurement policies.
Section III follows the stages of the program development process to
provide a more in-depth analysis of each stage of operation. The focus is
on the resulting product in terms of available inputs. The process is traced
from the finalized design back through the establishment of individual ship
requirements, force level/mix analysis, and the derivation of various
analytical inputs. The effect of non-Navy Department agencies (e.g. the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Congress, the Executive) are
treated in broad overview. These activities certainly have a significant
impact on the direction of Navy procurement programs, but a direct alteration
of their functions is not within the purview of the Department of the Navy.
A final factor which has a major bearing on the entire design process
is the character of the structure of the design and analysis organization.
A simple analysis of the functional processes of design is inadequate to
explain away the many obvious deficiencies of the entire system. It is only
through an appreciation of the bureaucratic structure which operates this
system - and provides primary system intertia - that one can come to grips
with the tremendous obstacles which confront a rapid movement to a more
efficient and effective design process.
The conclusion of the study is aimed not at developing an alternate
design process but at trying to determine if a more effective process can
be achieved. Not an insignificant body of opinion, both within and outside
of the Department of the Navy, holds that, despite admitted limitations,
the system is the best that can be expected given its operating constraints.
If this is indeed true, then the thrust of change can be constructively
directed at the elimination of costly and time-consuming functions which do
not contribute to, and may even inhibit, the design process. The lack of
communication and degree of parochialism which exists at each level of the
design process is remarkable in light of the amount of systems integration
that must go into the final product. If only to provide the first overview
of the decisionmaking process at each level, and the effects of those decisions
on the final design, this study will have served a purpose.
I. Surface Ship Procurement
The generation of naval force requirements involves the translation
of appropriation authority, world situations, and executive guidance into
Navy programs. The "official" process begins with the specification of
national interests by the President and his advisors (see Figure II).
National objectives are defined to assure satisfaction of the interests in
the face of foreign pressures and trends. Strategies are developed and
forged into a National Military Strategy to achieve the security objectives
in the face of foreign threats.1
Planning guidelines based on National Security Council (NSC) directives
are provided to the military agencies in the Defense Policy and Planning
Guidance (DPPG) memoranda. This guidance presents cases in the form of
possible wartime scenarios which are intended primarily to guide the services
in programming their resources into a particular force structure. This
high-level programming guidance is intended to have a strong and direct
influence on the derivation of ship requirements.
Navy requirements are derived from comparing the capabilities of the
present and programmed force to the needs of the National Military Strategy
and the difficulties provided by the threat to Navy mission accomplishment.
The CNO develops the CNO Program Planning Guidance (CPPG) which describes
Navy roles and missions, and furnishes broad Navy planning guidance. The
CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM) treats missions and support areas
in terms of cost and capabilities, and furnishes the basis for consideration
of broad program options.
In this basic mission framework, platform/systems combinations are
developed to fulfill identified tasks. Quantities needed to operate in
accordance with approved tactical doctrine are then determined, and a
balanced combination of platform/systems and level results. Force mix
analysis is conducted to determine the different types of ships with
unique capabilities that the Navy needs to carry out its missions. The
current naval force with programmed changes is extrapolated into the future
and modified according to the platform/system needs and the allied commit-
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Figure II. Derivation of Surface Warship Requirements
ments. A proposed force structure results from these deliberations.
The identified force structure requirements are ultimately expressed
in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Extended Planning Annex (EPA).
These documents are submitted annually by the Navy as proposed revisions
to the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).
Current DOD acquisition policies (e.g. DOD Directive 5000.1 of 18 Jan
1977) require that a clear tie and perspective be maintained between the
identified "mission need" and what is being developed in the program, in its
execution, and in its supporting documentation (see Figure III). The
Acquisition Phase for a naval surface combatant commences when a mission
need is submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Defense. This approval--
a Mission Element Need Statement or MENS - directs the Navy to develop
systematically and progressively alternative system concepts to satisfy the
approved need. In the Major System Acquisition Process this is known as
Program Initiation (Milestone "0").
Once the Program Initiation Phase is entered, the Office of the CNO
(OPNAV) prepares and transmits the Operational Requirements (OR) to the
appropriate Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) in NAVSEA. The OR is
the basic document for all Navy acquisition programs and initiates the con-
ceptual effort to meet the operational need. NAVSEA develops and translates
the ship's mission and operational requirements into a consistent set of
design constraints and parameters. For most ship acquisition programs, the
major parameter established by the OR is a tentative cost constraint setting
a "Design-to-Cost" (DTC) target.
In response to the OR a Development Proposal (DP) is prepared. The DP
states the OR's need, time frame, issues, program objectives and alterna-
tives, effectiveness, risk, achievement milestones, and other factors.
During the preparation of the DP there is iterative dialogue between OPNAV and
NAVSEA, with OPNAV developing the requirements and NAVSEA developing the
related ship studies. NAVSEA performs trade-off studies to develop whole
ship designs compatible with ship mission requirements and standards, includ-
ing determination of platform alternatives and optimum mission suites. The
results of these studies are incorporated in the Navy Decision Coordinating
Paper (NDCP) and presented to the CNO Executive Board (CEB) for review and
decision.
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Figure III. Phases of Surface Warship Procurement
The NDCP defines program issues, the considerations which support the
operational need, program objectives, program plans, and performance param-
eters. This document establishes the conceptual development program and
serves as the basis for preparation of the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP).
When the DP is forwarded to OPNAV, the SHAPM begins preparing the
Ship Acquisition Plan (SHAP). The SHAP outline is a plan of action and
milestones for accomplishing the acquisition with the intent that the probable
ship concept will ultimately be implemented.
Upon authorization to start the Feasibility/Conceptual Phase of the
acquisition process, the SHAPM initiates feasibility studies to determine
a preliminary ship concept. Concurrently, OPNAV begins to prepare the
first draft of the Top Level Requirements (TLR).
The TLR is promulgated and approved by the CNO and defines the opera-
tional requirements of the ship to be produced. As a minimum, the TLR
states the ship's mission, operational requirements, major configuration
constraints, maintenance and supply support concepts, manning limitations,
and minimum operational standards. It defines what OPNAV expects from the
product as obtained from the producer, NAVSEA. From a continuous iterative
dialogue between OPNAV and NAVSEA, a clear understanding of the require-
ments is gained. The system proposed in the TLR is then better defined in
terms of specific performance characteristics, schedule, and cost. In
addition, alternative hardware systems, tactics, and technologies are con-
sidered to ensure that the most effective, efficient, and economical system
is acquired to fulfill the need. In parallel with this refinement of the
TLR, the Top Level Specifications (TLS) is begun by NAVSEA.
The TLS translates the TLR into a description of the ship, providing
a bridge between the TLR and the contract specifications that are developed
for the procurement of the vessel. It states what the producer, NAVSEA,
intends to provide as a solution to fleet requirements as determined by
OPNAV. Through iterative dialogue and feasibility studies the ship and
ship systems are narrowed down to a preliminary concept. The designer
develops alternative configurations at the ship system level which reflect
varying operational requirements and which are translated into comparable
ship acquisition cost estimates. These alternatives, each satisfying a
unique set of operational requirements with an associated cost, are then
traded off until OPNAV selects an alternative that offers the desired balance
between operational requirements and cost. The TLS and TLR are companion
documents which are kept current throughout the design phase to continuously
reflect the specifications of the requirements/design product.
During the conceptual stage the SHAPM begins the first Test and Evalua-
tion Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP is the controlling document which defines
the test and evaluation requirements for each acquisition program.
Also during the Conceptual Phase, the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
is developed and is issued prior to the DSARC I (Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council) review. The purpose of the DCP is to support the DSARC
review and the Defense Secretary's decision-making process throughout the
ship acquisition phase. It is the principal document for recording the
essential information on a program. This information includes need/threat,
concept, milestones, thresholds, issues and risks, alternatives, management
plan, supporting rationale for the decisions, and affordability in terms
of project budget. The DCP also serves to record the Defense Secretary's
decision. To meet each DSARC decision point (milestone) for ship programs,
DCP I, II, and III are developed when preparing to start the preliminary
design, contract design, and detail design respectively. The DCP III is
updated for the follow-ship procurement DSARC review.
DSARC I is the decision point where the Secretary of Defense considers
to approve or disapprove the ship acquisition. The documents supporting
DSARC I are the DCP, the preliminary TLR, the Conceptual Baseline (CBL) with
its DTC goal, and the first TEMP and SHAP outlines.
The Preliminary Design Phase commences when approval is received from
the Secretary of Defense after DSARC I. This phase is the period of the
ship acquisition when the technical characteristics of the alternatives
proposed during the conceptual phase are established, delineated, and
validated. Tradeoffs and reductions to remain within the cost constraints
are the essence of this design phase. The main product of this phase is
the Functional Baseline (FBL), which is reflected in the TLR and TLS.
It is sometime beyond DSARC I that OPNAV is to establish a military
payload "freeze". It is also during this time frame that OPNAV, in conjunction
with the SHAPM, will start to develop the Tactical Operational Requirement
(TOR). The TOR describes, in operational terms, all of the requirements
that have been established for the ship to perform its assigned mission.
During this phase of acquisition, the preliminary TLR and TLS are devel-
oped concurrently into final form for issue prior to DSARC II. The prelimi-
nary design process establishes the FBL and provides the information required
to present the program for Department of the Navy (DON) Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DNSARC) review and DSARC decision. DCP II, which updates
DCP I, should support the decision made by the Secretary of Defense to
enter the full-scale engineering development in the Contract Design Phase.
When approval is received to proceed, the Contract Design Phase develops
the FBL into an Allocated Baseline (ABL) and develops a suitable contract
bid package for the prospective shipbuilder. The final TLS is issued prior
to DSARC III. To obtain program approval for lead and follow ships at DSARC
III, evidence has to be presented that the systems, subsystems, and equip-
ments proposed as a part of the ship system will have a reasonable degree
of success. To obtain this evidence, the TEMP is invoked.
With the completion of this phase of acquisition the ABL, consisting
of the performance oriented contract specifications and drawings governing
the development of all shipboard systems, has been accomplished. The DCP
III, which is an update of DCP II, supports the decision by the Secretary
of Defense to enter production/development in the Detail Design and Construc-
tion Phase.
The idealized design and development process for each new class of
ship is an exhausting administrative exercise which consumes at least several
years. The ultimate objective of the multi-layered review process is to
ensure that the ship that is bought is the best possible product that can
be obtained for the money.
This current developmental framework resulted from major defense
systems acquisition problems experienced in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Cost overruns, construction delays, and a failure of major systems to meet
performance requirements led to the imposition of this process requiring
continuous project review and justification. A determination of the validity
of the process in achieving its stated goals requires an understanding of
the failure of previous procurement concepts. The DD-963 and FFG-7 class
acquisition programs are the two most significant attempts in recent years
by the Navy to maximize total ship performance within cost and manning
constraints.
IIA. The DD-963 Class Acquisition Program
The Total Package Procurement (TPP) concept for the acquisition of
naval ships was introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1965.
This process entailed Concept Formulation/Contract Definition (CF/CD) which,
through competition in industry, led to the development of a design, and the
contract for the procurement of new ships built to that design. Up until
that time shipbuilders had dealt with the ship construction aspect only -
their bidding based entirely upon a design developed and provided by the
Navy. The primary objectives of CF/CD were, 1) to minimize costs through
competitive design and bidding - and then to control that cost with a total
package procurement contract, and 2) to spur innovative design and construc-
tion concepts.
Concept formulation was performed by the Navy to verify the compatibility
of all performance requirements. At the outset of the contract definition
phase, the Navy's requirements for a new ship design were transmitted to the
prospective contractors in terms of ranges of performance characteristics.
Their responses were to reflect a balanced design solution considering
performance criteria, design standards, and production techniques. This
process emphasized the industry's responsibility for the ultimate satisfac-
tory performance of the ship.
The end product of Contract Definition was a proposal from each would-
be contractor for Total Package Procurement. This included a set of ship
plans and specifications developed by the contractor in response to the
Navy's requirements. The Navy then chose that contractor whose ship design
and plans for construction were considered the most cost-effective.
Three ship acquisition programs were defined and developed by the
CF/CD process: the Fast Deployment Logisitics ship (cancelled upon completion
of CF/CD), the LHA Amphibious Assault ship, and the DD-963 Spruance class
destroyer.
In 1966 Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed the DX/DXG program for
a new class of ocean escorts needed to replace the aging 2200 ton World War
II destroyers in the fleet. As the first director of the Navy's Systems
Analysis Division (0P-96), Admiral Elmo Zumwalt headed the "Major Fleet
Escort Study" which was issued on August 5, 1967. 2 The study was an in-
depth analysis of the future escort requirements of the U. S. fleet. Likely
operating scenarios were developed, future threats postulated, and notional
ship types developed to determine trade-off values with escorted units.
Two ASW (anti-submarine warfare) destroyers - DXs - and two ASW/AAW (anti-
air warfare) destroyers - DXGs - with various power plants were investi-
gated and optimized into high, medium, and low threat scenarios. The
results of the analysis recommended a minimum fleet escort level of 242,
with a specified combination of missile and ASW escort ships. These ships
were to be of mixed conventional and nuclear power plants.
The DX escort was envisioned by OPNAV and the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV) as a low-capability, inexpensive successor to the DE-1052 Knox
class - an approximate displacement of 4000 to 6000 tons and an estimated
cost of $40 to $45 million. The notional DXG(N) - a higher capability,
nuclear powered ship - was seen as almost half again as large and as costly
as the DX. Follow-on studies noted a general fleet dissatisfaction with the
speed and reliability of existing escort classes for aircraft carrier escort
duty. This tended to add a strong bias against construction of additional
single screw ships with a top speed less than 30 knots.
The pre-solicitation conference for the DX/DXG program was conducted
for the prospective contractors on October 27, 1963. 3 No final number of
destroyers to be produced was stipulated, but a minimum for the DX-type was
set at 20. Various guidelines and constraints were set down from the
start which were to severely restrict the desired design innovation. It was
noted that historically 75% of ship operating costs were attributable to
personnel. A premium was therefore stipulated on reducing life-cycle cost
by reducing ship manning. Procurement of foreign combat systems was permitted
to the extent of the restrictive Buy American Act.4  This had the effect of
limiting combat systems candidates to the few choices available from American
producers.
The Operational Requirements (OR) for the combat system suite actually
went far beyond a statement of required performance, and listed the specific
equipment that was to appear on the platform. The OR stated that the
selection of weapons and sensors was governed by the ship missions and the
availability of armament. It was explicitly stipulated that only operation-
ally proven systems would be utilized.
No new, untried weapons and sensors are desired or will
be permitted. The Department of Defense has invested large
sums over the years in designing, testing, and approving
weapons and sensors to fulfill specific operational require-
ments. The ship procurement program is not the time to igcur
additional costs in designing and qualifying new systems.
The general belief at the time was that the DX would be complemented
by an extensive class of high-capability missile escorts. The DX was there-
fore given an ASW/shore bombardment capability with the following systems
being stipulated in the OR: ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket), torpedoes, ASW
helicopter, two gun mounts, and an AAW point defense system (limited to
ship self-defense). With the restrictions of the Buy American Act and the
necessity of using only proven equipment, the specific system options were
drastically curtailed. Only one type of ASROC (the MK-16), helicopter (the
SH-2), torpedo (the MK-46), and AAW point defense system (BPDMS AIM-7) ful-
filled these criteria. The only real decision was in the type of gun mount
to install. The old 5"/38 was relatively incapable and too heavily manned
when considered against the newer 5"/54 mounts. Of the two 5"/54 mounts
available, the heavyweight - MK-42 - had twice the rate of fire and ready
service rounds, and 200 greater elevation than the newer, lightweight MK-45.
The decision to select the MK-45 was based not on performance characteristics
in anticipated scenarios, but on the fact that the lightweight mounts would
save 15 men - each calculated to add a 20 year sustained cost of over
$170,000 to the ship. 7
Consideration was given to possible combat systems conversion and
improvement (e.g. the replacement of one 5"/54 with the 8"/55, and the re-
placement of the MK-16 ASROC with the MK-26 Tartar AAW and ASROC launcher)
but these considerations would be dependent upon the hull design and power
plant - both of which were left up to the individual contractor.
In February of 1968 the Navy issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) to
various contractors soliciting proposals outlining preliminary designs for
construction of the DX. The RFP specified maximum speed, cruise speed and
range, and requirements on seakeeping as well as the specific payload,
weapons, and electronics packages. The RFP indicated the capabilities and
systems that the Navy required in the ship, and defined the optimal ship
design as the one meeting those requirements at the minimum life cycle
cost.
In July of 1968 three competitors were chosen - Litton, General Dynamics,
and Bath Iron Works - and each awarded $10 million and 9 months to come up
with a system, a production plan, and a bid. The Navy's objective was to
maximize innovation and minimize cost through open competition.
Due to editing and subsystem integration requirements, the ultimate
contractor, Litton, had only three months to complete all of the original
work and major decisions relating to the final design.8 In this time con-
straint the "older" naval architects at Litton reportedly decided to concen-
trate on giving the Navy what they thought the Navy really wanted in the
DX - not necessarily what the RFP said. It was felt that the RFP require-
ment "...and systems analysis vernacular had been forced on ... (the Navy)
... by DOD."9 The ultimate designers felt that the Navy really wanted a
ship with greater capabilities than those specified, did not really want to
go with the low manning requirements needed, would not accept unusually low
design margins, and really wanted a gas turbine ship (even though no power
plant had been specified in the RFP).
The lack of time available for hull testing led to a series of conser-
vative decisions and "inevitable" mistakes.10 Over-estimated power require-
ments based on inadequate scaling discriminated sharply against some power
plant types. The only gas turbines approved for use by the Navy (the LM-2500)
came in only one size. With the chosen hull form, it required a little
more than two gas turbines to make maximum speed and one half of a turbine
to make cruise speed. This would mean poor fuel consumption, an unwieldy
three turbine plant, and a big ship.
An analysis of various power plants indicated that for the required
performance, the cheapest candidate would be a CODAG (combination diesel and
gas turbine). In order of increasing expense, the remaining candidate
plants were three gas turbines, steam, and four gas turbines. Despite the
promise shown by CODAG, Litton decided that it was too late to change from
the original turbine design. The decision was made to go with three gas
turbines in Litton's DP to the Navy in April of 1969. Soon afterwards,
due to uncertainties relating to the combining gear for the three turbine
plant, the decision was made to add the fourth turbine. Litton had earlier
admitted that such an addition would greatly increase life cycle costs.11
The resulting ship is considered to be at least 50% overpowered. Subsequent
analysis has indicated that given greater time for hull design and testing,
a longer ship could have been developed to take advantage of the lower power
requirement, and the number of gas turbines required reduced from four to
12
two.
The resulting DD-963 has not proven to be an unsuccessful ship, but
certainly the original aims of the CF/CD development concept were not
achieved. It has been generally accepted both within Litton and among those
involved in the DX program in the Navy, that Litton's primary aim was not
to find the cheapest ship meeting the RFP's requirements, but rather to
maximize the probability that Litton got the production contract. Litton
continually tried to second guess the Navy's evaluation board.13 There
was no incentive to produce a cheap ship, only one that was cheaper than
those designed by the competitors. Litton had never built a destroyer
before and proposed to do it in a new, automated shipyard which fit together
prefabricated modules of the hull. As Admiral Zumwalt recalled, "Litton
took a lot longer time and spent a lot more money getting into production
than it had expected to, or could recover from the Navy under the contracts."14
The contract that the Navy signed in June of 1970 called for Litton to
provide thirty 8000 ton DD-963s at $100 million a copy. Despite the fact
that the combat system had not changed, this represented quite a growth
over the 4000 to 6000 ton, $45 million low capability ship originally
envisioned for the DX program. Admiral Zumwalt later termed the growth a
"miraculous metamorphosis" into a far too expensive ship with relatively
austere capabilities for its size.15 It would be this reaction to the growth
of the DX that was to have a profound effect on the design of the follow-on
escort class.
Certainly the Navy shares the largest portion of responsibility for the
platform that it got in the DD-963. The requirement for the follow-on to the
DE-1052 class had certainly been anticipated for a number of years, yet the
final design decisions were forced into a three month period (the Navy
spent another year deciding on the contract winner).16 The Navy was not
really looking for an integrated design to fulfill specified missions as
much as it was simply looking for a hull to carry the combat system that
had already been chosen. The RFP stipulated rough requirements, but the
Navy provided no input to the contractors as to what it was willing to
pay for an increase in individual capabilities. The design process was
therefore largely open-ended, and led to a much more expensive platform
than the Navy could probably have gotten with equal performance capabilities.
The competitive process did not spur innovation so much as it served to
shut off communication between the Navy and the individual contractors. As
a result, the designers complained of having to guess what the Navy wanted,
what it would be willing to pay, and what tradeoffs it would accept.1 7
Criticisms of the design and development of the DD-963 (as well as the
LHA) led to a reappraisal of the CF/CD process. In the concept formulation
stage it was noted that a needlessly large number of costly and protracted
studies (often independent) were being done by many diverse agencies.
Ship's mission statements were either non-existent or so broadly stated
that any variety of ship's weapons systems could satisfy them. The contract
definition type of procurement was seen severely to restrict the selection
to a narrow set of already produced weapons systems. Performance data and
costs were not available to study groups for more advanced combat systems,
so the resulting CF/CD process could not achieve the desired result of
performance optimization. As a result of the DD-963 experience the Navy
decided to turn back to its own design activity in NAVSEA - the Naval
Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC) - for the design of follow ship classes.
The Total Package Procurement acquisition approach, of a single contract
package for development and production for an entire ship class, was deemed
unsuccessful for naval ship acquisition. The TPP approach gave way to the
concept of "Design-to-Cost."
The Design-to-Cost (DTC) concept was introduced by DOD Directive 5000.1
in 1971. The intent of DTC was to make the unit cost of a weapon system
conform to a value which had been established either prior to or very early
in the design. The DTC concept has been defined as:
Trading performance for cost until we are assured
that a balance is achievable wherein needed military
performance can be pruided at a price we can afford for
the quantity we need.
A close look was also taken at the way that OPNAV had handled ship
procurement up to 1971. The CNO staff was found deficient in that:19
1) There was no single organization for the establishemnt of ship
characteristics for all types of ships. Efforts to establish ship character-
istics extended into months as various concerned offices on the CNO's staff
debated the specific requirements for the ship.
2) There was no standard procedure as to how the requirement derivation
was to be achieved - thus each new program developed along a different
track.
3) Since the process was seldom done the same way twice, those who were
to establish the requirements were almost always unfamiliar with what to do.
This situation was seen to need some correction at the same time that
DTC was gaining momentum in the Department of Defense. As a result, studies
in 1971 and 1972 led to the establishment of the Office of Ship Acquisition
and Improvement (OP-97) within OPNAV. OP-97 was disestablished and replaced
by the Ship Acquisition Panel in 1974 after two years of leading the require-
ment/design dialogue.
Even with the introduction of DTC and the return of the design process
to the Navy, it was recognized that there would have to be a fundamental
change in the relationship between OPNAV and the Naval Material Command
(NAVMAT) in order to produce a ship that would meet identified fleet needs.
Communications between OPNAV and NAVMAT had traditionally been poor. This
was in part caused by the lack of an adequate documentation process for OPNAV
to submit operational requirements to NAVSEA (a subordinate command of NAVMAT)
for design solutions. Definitions for required ship system performance ranged
from a mixture of detailed hardware specifications for radars, weapons, and
electronics, to extreme generalities (e.g. "best obtainable seakeeping
qualities"). Certain requirements and performance were mentioned at great
length by OPNAV while others were only casually mentioned or ignored.20
Prior to 1971 design activity was concentrated outside of NAVMAT with
advice only being requested on a "what if" basis. The analysis groups in
OPNAV, while recognized as being capable of performing force-level type
operational analyses, lacked the technical depth in ship engineering needed
to assess to a sufficient level of detail whether the specified requirements
were compatible with the available technology, specified equipment, and cost
constraints. The result was a back and forth dialogue between OPNAV and
NAVMAT that ultimately resulted in the final characteristics definition.
This definition was usually characterized by a mixture between hardware and
performance specifications without any certainty as to systems compatibility.
The DLGN-36 class is one ship that has been particularly singled out for
its high level of compatibility problems at time of delivery.21
Decisions were often made by designers unknown to OPNAV or contrary
to unspecified OPNAV requirements. There was often no documentation for the
rationale of OPNAV decisions, and new personnel tended to generate change
orders in terms of their own perceived requirements.
It was to alleviate these dialogue problems between OPNAV and NAVMAT
that the Top Level Requirements (TLR) and Top Level Specifications (TLS)
were developed. The objective of the TLR was to provide an adequate document
for the specification of ship requirements to the designers in NAVSEA. The
optimum system to meet those requirements, within cost constraints, would
then be transmitted back to OPNAV through the TLS. The intent was to allow
the ship designer - one more closely related to ship performance character-
istics and integration requirements - to accept the burden from OPNAV of
matching specific hardware to identified performance requirements.
It was Design-to-Cost and the TLR/TLS concept that served as the basis
for the FFG-7 ship acquisition program.
IIB. The FFG-7 Class Acquisition Program
Early in 1970 it was determined to investigate development of a follow-
on ocean escort class to the DD-963. It was obvious that the acquisition
cost of the DD-963 class would preclude the huge buy of that ship necessary
to fill the growing escort gap created by the decommissioning of the Navy's
World War II vintage destroyers. Thus the PF (Patrol Frigate) program
initiated by CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in September of 1970 became the attempt
to get the inexpensive, low-capability escort that the Navy had originally
envisioned for the DD-963 program.
Preliminary studies indicated that a large number of ships in the 3000
to 3500 ton range would be the most feasible buy. Compulsory guidance pro-
vided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense had tied all weapons systems
procurement to support of a NATO war in Europe. The effectiveness of all
systems had to be proven in that environment. For the PF program (as well
as Zumwalt's concurrently proposed Sea Control Ship), this meant that it was
placed, hypothetically, into a 1980s variation of the Battle of the Atlantic.
Given this scenario, a severe cost constraint, and the absence of AAW
systems on most existing frigates, the CNO's subjective concept of the PF
became a missilized ocean escort. The size and speed constraints would pre-
clude a carrier escort role, and extensive ASW and shore bombardment capa-
bility was intentionally deleted. Thus the mission that the PF was designed
around was that of an AAW ocean escort to supplement existing ASW forces
in merchant, naval amphibious, and auxiliary ship convoys.22
The PF became the first combatant to be designed under the new Design-
to-Cost philosophy. Estimated total program costs were based primarily on
historical data from recent similar shipbuilding programs - such as the
DE-1052 and the DD-963 - modified to reflect anticipated differences in
such areas as procurement approach, systems engineering, program management,
and ship configuration. The FFG-7 conceptual design phase was characterized
by a large number of system level trade-off studies, resulting in the selec-
tion of characteristics for a single screw ship with primarily AAW capability.
It was estimated that the ship would cost approximately $50 million and
displace about 3700 tons. All PF program cost estimates were officially
catagorized as "Class F" at this program stage. Class F is defined by OPNAV
instruction as a "... ball park estimate ... generally calculated by merely
escalating to current dollars an empirical cost for a similar ship and adding
factors for expected changes in design, accounting procedures, or other
economic considerations." 23 The cost constraint required that the entire
ship system be designed to perform a specific mission just well enough so
that the system would be "cost optimized" rather than "performance optimized"
within given mission requirements. This involved deciding what each sub-
system had to contribute to the total ship system, and passing the cost
optimized rather than the performance optimized guidance to the ship design-
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ers.
In contrast to the DD-963 development, it was decided that the PF would
be an "in-house" design with shipbuilder assistance. Ship system design
would be started by NAVSEC immediately upon completion of preliminary
design, and developed for about four months. At this time, a competitively-
selected lead shipbuilder would be brought in to participate in the final
preparation of specifications and to prepare the detail design. This ship-
builder would then be awarded a contract to complete detail design and to
construct the lead ship. Of the eight contending shipyards, the lead ship
contract was eventually awarded to Bath Iron Works.
In June of 1971, as the ship proceeded into preliminary design, the
CNO established a follow-ship cost constraint of $45 million and a displace-
ment constraint of 3400 tons. Soon afterwards, an additional constraint on
ship's manning was established at 185. Although the basic ship character-
istics had been set, the CNO issued guidance directing that these character-
istics be changed, if necessary, in order to keep the ship within the cost
and displacement limits. 2 5
The "design-to" constraints imposed by the CNO of $45 million and 3400
tons were actually 10% below the feasibility estimates developed by NAVSEC.
The actual cost estimate for the selected PF design never went below $50
million, but NAVSEC spent a great deal of time and effort in trying to reduce
that cost by reducing the size and other methods.2 6
The selection of the 3400 ton limit was called a "...pretty unrealistic
goal" by NAVSEC's PF designers.27 The displacement estimate for the selected
design was actually 3695 tons. It has since been determined that an error
was made in the transmission of this displacement figure to OPNAV. At the
time that the maximum displacement decision was made, OPNAV thought that
the design was for a 3470 ton ship from which only 70 tons would have to be
cut, rather than 290 tons. This was a constraint which, as one designer
put it, "... gave us pains for years thereafter."28
The manning constraint of 185 also did not reflect the true design
requirement. NAVMAT studies showed that condition I manning (with no main-
tenance being performed) required 192 people. Condition III and condition V
manning required 225 to 231. Vice Admiral Price, who was the officer in
charge of the design as OP-03, decided to man the ship with condition I
requirements, with the assumption that the Navy would develop a program of
shore-based maintenance for each ship. Seven people were then cut from the
192-man requirement and the 185 figure arrived at.29
The overriding objective of the PF design effort was first to reduce
the design to within the specified constraints, and then to control the
design to remain within the constraints. Many of the participants within
NAVMAT felt that the "design-to" constraints were dictated within the office
of the CNO without adequate communication or dialogue with those responsible
for the technical aspects of the ship design in NAVSEC.30 Although the CNO
set a limitation of 3400 tons, it is clear that he did not particularly want
a 3400 ton escort. What he wanted was a $45 million escort with certain
performance capabilities which happened to result in a ship design of 3400
tons. The displacement constraint was specified because a direct relation-
ship was seen between weight and cost, with weight growth being much easier
to monitor on a day to day basis.31 The manning constraint was established
with the idea that reduced manning would hold down ship size and also decrease
ship life cycle cost.
In light of the DD-963 experience, the CNO's fears of cost escalation
were not unfounded. With the Navy about to drop below a level of 500 ships
for the first time since World War II it was deemed of primary importance to
get a large number of hulls into the water as soon as possible. The $45
million acquisition cost was based on a fixed procurement plan for 49 follow
ships (7 ships in FY 1975, 11 in FY 1976, 10 in FY 1977, 10 in FY 1978, and
11 in FY 1979). OPNAV saw an increase in unit cost resulting in a decrease
in the total number of units procured. Zumwalt noted that for the price of
one DLGN (Admiral Rickover's "enormously expensive ...pets", as the CNO
called them) the Navy could have 2½ DD-963s or 5 PFs. Zumwalt saw either
alternative as providing more fighting power than the single ship.3 2
In reviewing the acquisition policy of the FFG-7 (the later designation
of the PF program), a primary question that must be addressed is whether
DTC resulted in a more efficient design, or whether the somewhat arbitrary
constraints on ship size and manning resulted in a ship lacking in basic
capability. It was never adequately determined whether a higher performance
ship could be produced for the same cost - or indeed what the cost/perform-
ance tradeoffs were. CNO guidance was explicit in placing performance con-
sideration far behind those of cost, displacement, and manning. The DD-963
has been widely criticized for its lack of firepower in relation to its
size, but the Spruance hull was designed with over a thousand tons of margin
for major combat systems additions. By contrast, the FFG-7 was made specif-
ically "tight", with a growth margin (after some preplanned configuration
changes)33 of only 50 tons. Obviously whatever the Navy got in the FFG-7,
it is pretty much going to have to live with.3 4
Determination of the ship's performance characteristics was made prima-
rily through subjective mission definition, systems availability, and weight
limitations. The mission of the FFG-7 as stated in the Approved Character-
istics of 24 October 1972 is:
To provide self-defense and effectively supplement
planned and existing escorts in the protection of under-
way replenishment groups, amphibious forces, and military
mercantile shipping against sub-surface, air, and surface
threats; and to conduct ASW operations in conjunction with
other sea control forces tasked S ensure our use of essen-
tial sea lines of communication.
The FFG-7 was intended to supplement the planned and existing fleet of
escort ships and to operate primarily with non-strike forces. As such, the
PF was envisioned as an AAW ship with limited ASW and anti-surface capability,
and without excessive speed.
No speed requirement was specified for the ship, but the CNO stipulated
that the PF would have one-half of a DD-963 power plant with whatever per-
36formance that resulted. Two LM-2500 gas turbines were utilized, and a
single shaft was chosen for a savings of $3 million and about 400 tons over
a twin screw ship. The resulting speed made the FFG-7 unacceptable for
carrier escort duty as had been anticipated.
During the early feasibility studies when the initial characteristics
of the FFG-7 were established, a large number of trade-off studies were made
to analyze the performance and cost impact of numerous payload mixes and
platform features. Since the FFG-7 would be a supplement to existing escorts,
the ASROC capability was deleted and the single purpose MK-13 missile
launcher installed. The utilization of a lower capability sonar was selected
for a 96 ton saving.
It was determined that a lightweight OTO Melara gun mount would save
at least 16 tons over the MK-45 5"/54 that was being installed on the DD-963s,
and that the OTO's MK-87 gun fire control system would save 11 tons over the
5"/54's MK-86 system. The 35mm OTO Melara was originally stipulated for
installation, but due to questionable capabilities and availability, the
gun was given minimal priority in the design (as evidenced by its ultimate
location and poor field of fire).38
In all, 1469 tons of capability and equipment were deleted from the
original notional PF design and 205 tons added to bring the ship into dis-
placement constraints. Of that 1469 tons, 614 tons related directly to
combat systems capability and 239 tons to the crew reduction from 253 to
185. Of the 205 tons added, only 47 tons were directly related to military
performance - thus illustrating, as one designer pointed out, "... that it
is difficult to design a warship in a peacetime environment."39
Quite clearly the DTC philosophy did accomplish its principal objective
in constraining the unit production cost of the FFG-7. It has been established
that the FFG-7 would have displaced closer to 5000 tons (a 40% increase)
without DTC. 40 The question of whether or not the FFG-7 is fully capable for
its assigned mission is one that is much more difficult to answer. In order
to keep the design "tight" a fine distinction had to be drawn between mini-
mal essential performance requirements and excessive performance capabilities.
In the absence of any adequate method to quantify performance for the entire
ship system, the determination of capability remains rather subjective and
strongly dependent upon individual perception of naval requirements. This
issue, the crux of the performance/cost tradeoff process, will be discussed
in detail in later sections.
IIC. Current Ship Development Programs
In the wake of the DD-963 and FFG-7 programs, combatant ship design
proposals blossomed to encompass the rapidly developing platform and combat
systems technologies. A general consensus developed in the Navy that the
FFG-7 would remain the least expensive fleet escort that the Navy could pro-
duce. With the current procurement cost exceeding $250 million a copy (in
1980 dollars) the '"minimum" price is not insignificant. In the face of a
limited procurement budget and escalating ship costs, the Navy has increas-
ingly found itself unable to provide adequate justification for embarking into
completely new avenues of technological development.
Air Capable Platforms
The Sea Control Ship (SCS) was seen by then-CNO Admiral Zumwalt as a
key element of his "low-mix" force in the early 1970s. Nominally envisioned
as a 14,000 ton, $120 million low capability air platform (3 VSTOL aircraft
and 14 helicopters) for military convoy protection, the SCS received a cool
reception in Congress and died altogether under Zumwalt's successor.
The question of a follow-on carrier to CVN-70 went through numerous
gyrations between a medium-sized CV (or CVV), a conventional fossil-fueled
large CV, and a repeat of the Nimitz class CVN. Congressional authorization
and presidential concurrence were finally received for the last proposal -
CVN-71 - in late 1979.
Advanced Naval Vehicles
The development of advanced platform technology in the early 1970s was
expected by many to shape the future of the surface fleet. Under the encom-
passing label of "Advanced Naval Vehicles" the most promising and heavily
funded designs were the air cushion vehicle (ACV), the surface effect ship
(SES), and the hydrofoil craft.
The ACV was utilized for the "JEFF" prototype landing craft and was
eventually incorporated as a major operational adjunct to the LSD-41 amphib-
ious ship program.
The SES was the Navy's most heavily-backed ANV. Basically an air
cushion vehicle with water-penetrating side walls, the SES has virtually
unlimited size potential with speed limits over 100 knots, The concept was
envisioned for use both as a platform for high performance aircraft and as
a high speed fleet escort to succeed the DD-963 (the DSX Program) and the
FFG-7 (the FFSG program). Problems of underway maintenance and increasing
development costs raised serious doubts about the program, and it was the
Navy's inability analytically to "prove" the military worth of such a high
performance surface craft to OSD and Congress that eventually resulted in
a halt of prototype development.
After a decade of testing a number of patrol hydrofoils the Navy pushed
for a major NATO buy of the craft in the early 1970s. Significant differences
soon arose among the buying parties - primarily Italy and Germany - as to
the craft size and configuration. This conflict, coupled with increasing
foreign doubt as to U. S. acquisition intentions, led to a dissolution of
the NATO program. The United States had intended to authorize the purchase
of 30 PHMs (patrol hydrofoils) in 1975, but as a result of cost growth and
schedule slippage only six were authorized for purchase in 1976 (and these
primarily to sustain German interest in the program). The primary problem
was, again, the inability of the Navy to "sell" the PHM concept to OSD and
Congress. The craft had significant speed capabilities, but were severely
payload limited, did not have particularly good operating or maintenance
records, and required significant support facilities. Against these draw-
backs the Navy could not demonstrate a satisfactory military need for the
product. The last five of the six PHMs are currently under construction,
but Secretary of Defense Harold Brown expressed the predominant OSD and
Congressional sentiments when he stated in 1978, "I continue to think the
program is of very limited value... ,41
A final ANV program that showed significant promise in the eyes of some
designers was the SWATH (Small Water-Plane Area Twin Hull). About ten years
old, the concept showed significant improvement in seakeeping ability that
could double helicopter operating time underway. The major development
problem is the lack of an active sponsor in OPNAV to persuade OSD and Congress
that the military utility is worth the development expense.
Aegis
In November of 1963 the Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) project
was inaugurated to develop a surface-to-air missile system with the "tightest"
possible reaction time. A total system designation package was developed
and the Aegis Weapon System Engineering Development contract signed with RCA
in December of 1969. The Aegis system became operationally capable in 1974
and assumed the unique position (in terms of conventional U. S. ship design)
of a combat system in search of a hull.
Aegis was originally scheduled for the DLGN-38 (later CG-38) class, but
when Congress reduced that class form 23 to 5 ships in 1971 it was evident
that the class would be completed too early for the AAW system. In January
of 1972 the CNO proposed a DG class designed specifically for Aegis. At the
same time, Congress began investigating the question of limiting high-capa-
bility strike group warships to nuclear propulsion. In May of 1973 the
Secretary of the Navy directed consideration of both a gas turbine-powered
DG and a nuclear powered DLGN for Aegis. By the end of the year both of
these proposals had been cancelled and the CSGN strike cruiser was under
consideration. Also proposed was the backfitting of Aegis into USS Long
Beach (CGN-9). In June of 1975 the Secretary of Defense directed the devel-
opment of both a gas turbine ship and the CSGN to carry Aegis. In April of
1976 Congress rejected the CSGN proposal, and later that year the President
rejected the CGN-9 backfit.
While this was going on, work had been done to adapt Aegis to the basic
DD-963 hull and power plant. By April of 1976 the preliminary design of the
DDG-47 was completed. The Secretary of Defense approved the DDG-47 program
in December of 1976 and Congress authorized it in 1977. Plans also proceeded
for a nuclear-powered cruiser class of Aegis ships - the CGN-42. By the
end of 1979 this program had been shelved due to excessive cost.
The unique aspect of the DDG-47 program is the "topside down" design
philosophy - the ship design being somewhat driven by the combat system
package. To facilitate the development program the project was chartered
in NAVSEA and the project manager, Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, was given
the authority and direct responsibility for development of both the ship and
the combat system. With the possible exception of the Polaris program,
this was the first time that a single officer would be given full responsi-
bility for the successful development of a warship.42
Displacing 1000 tons more than the DD-963, the lead CG-47 (the hull des-
ignation was changed in January of 1980) is under construction by Litton
Industries and is scheduled for delivery in January of 1983. The Navy hopes
to purchase two CG-47s for each carrier.
Surface Escorts
The number of available fleet escorts continues to be a perceived defi-
ciency by the Navy, and one that must be addressed in the immediate future.
The DD-931/945 and DDG-31/37 classes are scheduled to begin retiring in the
mid-1980s, and the DDG-2, FF-1040/1052, and CG-16/26 classes in the mid-
1990s. With a seven year development time for a new warship class (utilizing
existing combat systems) developments for the follow-ship classes to the
DD-963 and FFG-7 have been under consideration for several years. The failure
to obtain ANV funding has focused consideration on conventional hulls and
combat systems - with serious question as to the availability of acquisition
money on the one hand, and technological capability to meet the 21st century
threat on the other.
The CNO issued an OR for a follow-on to the FFG-7 - the FFGX - in 1977.
Preliminary conceptual studies were begun, but with strong competition from
more critical projects the program never gained momentum. In late 1979 the
CNO proposed a completely new concept of developing a class of small, inexpen-
sive frigates for use by the naval reserve forces. The proposed FFX is
nominally envisioned as one half of an FFG-7 - about 1800 tons and 270 feet -
with an austere armament. The impetus behind the concept is not completely
evident, but strong criticism from various factions has already arisen against
the FFX idea.
The Spruance class is currently close to completion with the last of
the series of 30 launched in 1979. Four missile-equipped DD-963s - DDG-993 -
996 (the Kidd class) - originally ordered by the Iranian Navy will join the
U. S. fleet, and what will probably be the last Spruance - DD-997 - has
also been authorized.
Study has been underway for some time in OPNAV and NAVSEA as to the
follow-on class to the DD-963 which will replace the DDG-2 class in the late
1980s and early 1990s. In December of 1975 the DDX program was initiated
by NAVSEA. The primary purpose of the program was to draw conclusions on
desired characteristics for the Navy's next generation of destroyer in order
to provide some orientation to the Navy's research and development (R&D)
programs. Evaluations of alternate combat suites were made and ship feasi-
bility studies were initiated in March of 1977.43
In October of 1977 the CNO issued the OR for the proposed DDM, with the
DDX characteristics being incorporated into that program. Eight alternative
ship programs were studied for the DDM - all of which retained the basic
hull and propulsion plant of the DD-963 as directed by the OR. In March
of 1978 the DDM designation was officially changed by OPNAV to the DDX. In
April of 1978, the DDX OR was cancelled by the CNO, primarily because of a
disagreement within OPNAV on the validity of the DDX mission as described
in the OR. By that time the DP was essentially complete, although no longer
valid.
Shortly after the cancellation of the DDX OR, a new study effort was
initiated to determine the future combatant requirements of the Navy. In
response to a CNO request, OP-03 issued the DDX Study Directive which estab-
lished the CNO DDX Study Group. The objective of the study was to define
alternative capabilities of a surface combatant capable of supporting battle
group operations and fulfilling cruiser/destroyer missions. Boundaries on
the desired ship size ranged from a low of 3500 tons and $200 million (FY 1979)
to a high of 8900 tons and $700 million. Fiscal year 1984 was defined as
the funding year for the lead ship of the class. What was desired was a
"mid-mix" ship - significantly less expensive than the DDG-47 and yet
significantly more capable than the FFG-7.44
NAVSEC was given responsibility for overall preliminary ship configura-
tion. The alternatives selected by the DDX study group for analysis included
11 basic alternatives, four of which were existing classes (FFG-7, DD-963,
DDG-993, and DDG-47). The seven new baseline DDX alternatives ranged in
capability from the FFG-7 to the DDG-47. The study group report was dis-
tributed in June of 1979, but by December, when approval was given to enter
the conceptual phase, the combat system was still far from being set. Strong
pressure had been applied by the Aegis community to provide at least some
Aegis capability to the class. The problem then became one of size and cost
growth as the DDGX (as it was now designated) began to resemble the CG-47
design, In addition to some Aegis capability, vertical launched missiles
and a VSTOL or helo capability were considered likely, Cost and weight
constraints would drop the CG-47's 5"/54 mounts in favor of a 76mm gun
(ostensibly to provide some kind of warlike appearance to the otherwise flush
decks). The specific procurement arrangements have not been decided upon,
but indications are that a DTC base (with possible size restrictions as
applied to the FFG-7) would be utilized with greater contractor involvement
in the initial design and development.
As the only active design program for a new (but not authorized) ship
class currently ongoing in the Navy, the DDGX is widely regarded as a "last
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shot" prospect for the surface fleet. Strong competition is likely from
industrial and Congressional factions who are pushing for additional or
modified FFG-7s, DD-963s, and CG-47s as an alternative to embarking on a
costly new design and development program.
The use of Design-to-Cost in the FFG-7 development program has been
widely praised for its resulting in a ship optimized to a low procurement
cost. Although ideally suited to the production of a "low-mix" platform,
it is not clear how DTC can be modified to allow platform optimization to
any specified level of higher system performance. The success of DTC has
been the willingness to completely subordinate performance to cost constraints.
The ship projects described in this section demonstrate the Navy's desire
to embark on programs optimized to some specific performance requirement.
The Navy's ability to obtain program funding for the number of ships desired
will largely depend on an ability to demonstrate an incremental performance
increase with cost. DTC cannot do this. A system that might is still
awaiting development.
IIIA. The Ship Design Process
The Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare (OP-03) is charged with determining
requirements, force levels, and major characteristics of ships of all classes
other than submarines and aircraft carriers. In the area of Research, Devel-
opment, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) OP-03 determines surface ship require-
ments, establishes priorities, coordinates integration and assimilation
into the fleet, and recommends approval for service use of surface systems,
weapons, and equipment. OP-03 is resource sponsor for about 25% of the
Navy budget and controls about 70% of the major naval vessels.46
It is the job of OP-03 to accept and synthesize the inputs from systems
analysis, OT&E, tactical development and evaluation (Tac D&E), and combat
systems development activities, and to provide fleet requirements to NAVSEA
for ship design and production within specified constraints. Ideally, the
NAVSEA designer develops several notional ships, each reflecting a different
set of operational requirements. These are translated into comparable ship
acquisition cost estimates. These alternatives, each satisfying a unique
set of operational requirements with an associated cost, are then traded off
until OP-03 selects a combination which offers the desired performance/cost
balance.
There are two primary approaches which can be taken in the design of
a new ship.47
1) "Topside Down" - This involves the design of the whole combat system
and all of the subelements to meet a set of established performance require-
ments. In other words, designing a ship to fulfill a specified mission.
2) "Bottom Up" - This approach starts with a group of separately devel-
oped combat subsystms and equipments, and pulls them together into an inte-
grated combat system on an established platform.
All recent Navy ship designs (with the limited exception of the CG-47)
have been based on the "bottom up" approach. This is more economical and
entails less risk, but it has resulted in the delineation of ship specifica-
tions in terms of specific equipments rather than acutal ship requirements.
The bottom up approach has been universally criticized by the ship
design community for its failure to allow the designers to perform any real
subsystem and equipment tradeoffs. The predominant feeling in NAVSEA has
been that OPNAV analysis groups are capable of performing force level analysis
but lack the technical depth of ship engineering needed to evaluate, to a
sufficient level of detail, whether the requirements for the ship are compati-
ble with the specified equipment. The TLR and TLS were developed to try and
overcome this perceived deficiency,
The objective of the TLR is to specify operational requirements and the
TLS to match hardware to those requirements. A survey of various combatant
TLRs indicates that this objective has not been met. The TLR does list per-
formance requirements, but in every case these general requirements are
coupled with a partial hardware list and further performance contraints that
restrict hardware selection to a few or a single model. For the most part,
this is the result of a predetermination in OPNAV - molded by a variety of
forces - as to what the proposed ship should be before NAVSEA is ever
brought into the design picture. From the perspective of NAVSEA designers,
subsequent communications with OPNAV are most often restricted to a series
of "what if" questions regarding combat systems options. There is little or
no explanation of intent, and often little time for NAVSEA to respond with
adequate technical depth.49
There is certainly some basis for the charge that OPNAV does not effec-
tively use the design expertise that is available in NAVSEA. The DDX study
group was established in 1978 to select configuration alternatives for the
proposed ship. The group consisted of seven naval officers appointed by
OP-03 (1 rear admiral, 2 captains, 3 commanders, and 1 lieutenant commander).
In order to get "up to speed" on current U. S. Navy programs as quickly as
possible, over forty briefings were made to the study group on subjects
ranging from ordnance and electronics development programs to habitability.
The study work was done on a "... very demanding time schedule, and, in
general, in a rather informal way."50 The OPNAV study was carried out despite
the fact that a DDX program had been initiated by NAVSEA in 1975 - over
two and a half years earlier - to evaluate DDX combat systems alternatives.
There is a strong feeling in NAVSEA that OPNAV not only does not
specifically know what it wants in a ship, but is not exactly sure when it
wants a new ship at all. The EPA (Extended Planning Annex) is supposed to
provide this guidance for OPNAV, but cases still exist, as in the DDX,
where NAVSEA initiates preliminary ship studies to fulfill follow-on require-
ments it sees coming up, but for which OPNAV has not yet established an
OR. Even when an OR is promulgated, the design is often perceived as being
driven by a simple follow-on timetable - i.e, "it's about time to build
another ship" 51 -- rather than an established mission requirement for a par-
ticular platform. Both the FFGX and DDX had such origins, The Navy has
expended tremendous resources in the conceptualization of the DDX without
ever having established that it has missions that cannot be fulfilled by
ships already in production.
The primary problems in the OPNAV/NAVSEA interface include:
1) Tremendous outside constraints which severely limit OPNAV choices
in determining ship characteristics;
2) Lack of meaningful dialogue coupled with a poor OPNAV understanding
of the design impact of various performance criteria;
3) The failure of OPNAV to quantify total ship performance to provide
for meaningful cost tradeoffs.
A modern combatant is comprised of approximately one hundred highly
integrated major subystems. In order to provide adequate interface and sup-
port for each subsystem the entire ship design must, at some point, be addressed
as a single unit. The impact that a single combat subsystem has on the over-
all ship design - in terms of weight; center of gravity; power, water, and
other support requirements; maintenance; and personnel is only marginally
understood in OPNAV and is seldom adequately addressed in the stipulation
of hardware requirements.52
The primary configuration dialogue that exists between OPNAV and NAVSEA
is a series of inquiries regarding subsystem impact in terms of dollars (or
other design constraints). Primary NAVSEA analysis is aimed at generating
answers to OPNAV questions rather than driving an integrated approach by
operator and designer to maximize performance. From the NAVSEA point of view,
OPNAV seldom seems to know what it wants in terms of specific performance
requirements, but rather designs into established size/cost constraints. It
is not uncommon in development programs for the TLR to be adjusted to reflect
requirements that have been or can be met, rather than to delineate require-
ments that must be met to perform an identified mission. As a result, the
TLR most often simply reflects the design rather than guides it. 5 3
Even to this extent, OPNAV seldom addresses the design problem directly
to NAVSEA. The majority of surface line officers assigned to be OPNAV pro-
gram sponsors have been criticized for not understanding the design process
and not being capable of communicating a request for what they actually
want. The result is a total system composed of disparate blocks that must
be integrated through costly land-based test sites or other means prior to
ship construction. As the PF project manager put it, "... we create only
'shopping list' ships occasioned by necessity."54
The lack of OPNAV/NAVSEA communication leads to such results as the
imposition of arbitrary constraints imposed exclusive of design considera-
tions. The FFG-7 is an excellent example of a ship arbitrarily constrained
by displacement with the actual intention of controlling cost. It is
entirely possible that a larger hull, providing greater design margin for
future growth, could have been constructed for the same unit cost. Even if
the unit cost had risen slightly, the increase in hull flexibility might
have proven cost-effective. The DDGX is facing a similar constraint without
adequate justification. Designers complain of having to guess what the CNO
actually wants in a platform by what he says he wants, and then "leaning"
the design in that direction.55
Arbitrary or unexplained constraints are imposed at a variety of levels
in OPNAV often well removed from any NAVSEA contact. An established charac-
teristic for the LSD-41 class was a sustained speed requirement two knots
greater than that of the amphibious fleet - without justification. A
reason offered by an OPNAV program sponsor for the additional two knots was
because, as commanding officer of an LST-1179 class ship, he could never keep
up with the fleet. He claimed that the LST didn't make designed speed and
wanted to guarantee that the LSD-41 would maintain sustained speed. In his
view, the best way to do it was to increase the requirement above and beyond
what was actually needed.56 The requirement for two additional knots may
seem small to an operator, but might require a major power plant reconfigu-
ration at the design level with a massive impact on the entire ship design
and cost. Adequate design documentation and improved communications between
OPNAV and NAVSEA could eliminate many such problems.
It is the responsibility of NAVSEA to perform "trade-off" studies to
develop whole ship designs compatible with mission requirements. Although
design constraints may be established by OPNAV, the trade-off consideration
is fundamentally performance versus cost. Within a maximum acquisition cost
combat subsystems are ideally subjected to rigorous evaluation until an
optimum balance of total ship performance is achieved to meet established
mission requirements. In reality such tradeoffs are seldom made.
The SQS-53 sonar was chosen for the DD-963 without a determination as
to whether the increased performance was worth the additional weight and
cost over other models. No study was made to determine if the fleet really
needed this performance.57 The MK-45 5"/54 gun has evolved as the Navy's
primary surface gun system - yet the gun development and subsequent selection
choice for a number of ship classes was based almost solely on its low manning
requirements. It remains to be seen whether the performance tradeoff for the
newer system is worth the decreased operating expense.
The general feeling in NAVSEA is that it is not the designer's role to
assess performance - that this role belongs to OPNAV (just as OPNAV keeps
saying).58 But the primary problem is the inability of OPNAV to quantify
total ship performance.
Tools have been developed by NAVSEA to establish marginal cost factors
about a baseline design for the commodities of weight, space, electrical power,
manning, etc. It is possible to estimate the shipboard cost influence of
a wide variety of subsystems without the necessity of specific design studies.
The designer can thus determine the least cost ship for a specified perfor-
mance level. In a notional 3500 ton destroyer design, the following figures
give an example of the approximate marginal cost per unit of the indicated
parameters:59
Parameter Cost Factor
Manning $23,300/man
Electric Power $742/KW
Space $336/ft 2
Using the appropriate cost factors, the total influence of ship cost for
competing subsystems can be determined by simply multiplying the parameter
quantities by the appropriate marginal cost and summing the results.
Designers have the capability of determining incremental costs, but
the factors are virtually useless since there has been no method developed
of determining incremental performance values - i.e., there are no corres-
ponding marginal performance factors to work with. It can readily be calcu-
lated what the cost impact is of adding one knot to a ship's speed, but no
one can quantitatively determine what one additional knot does for the
ship's performance. The cost increase may be calculated at 2%, but what is
the corresponding performance increase? If the performance increase cannot
be determined, NAVSEA asks, how does OPNAV know that that is what it is wil-
ling to pay for? This is really the fundamental question that NAVSEA would
like answered, and it is waiting for OPNAV to supply that answer,
In July and August of 1979 an engineering workshop commissioned by NAVSEA
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was conducted at the Center for Advanced Engineering Study at MIT. It was
the purpose of the workshop to investigate the process of ship design at
NAVSEA and make recommendations to bring greater effectiveness to the organi-
zation in turning out optimum ship systems.
The primary problem focused on by the study is the lack of NAVSEA impact
on ship configuration decisions. As a result, NAVSEA's role has largely
become one of ship procurement rather than systems design. A major cause
for this was identified as the increasing isolation of NAVSEA designers from
the decisionmaking process. Whereas the old Bureau of Ships was equal in
status to the line community under the Secretary of the Navy, the succeeding
NAVSEA directorates are subordinate to the line and located in the chain of
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command several levels below the CNO. The result is a lack of real influ-
ence on OPNAV decisions and an effective isolation from the political envi-
ronment which determines the fate of projects.
Much of the loss of status is beyond effective NAVSEA control, but a
number of deficiencies were identified within the organization which inhibit
the overall design objectives. A primary problem was seen as the lack of
innovation in total ship design. It was noted that no formal method exists
for anticipating future ship and system needs, and that there is no formal
process to obtain R&D community inputs at the early stages of design. SHAPMs
tend to focus narrowly on procurement costs and schedules, with a reluctance
to "make waves" or take risks by embarking on innovative design paths. Most
NAVSEA studies and activities were characterized as being "reactive" in
nature - used primarily to justify previous decisions.
The workshop also noted a general lack of knowledge of the correlation
between subsystem parameters and the total ship system, and a lack of conti-
nuity between design projects. This, coupled with delays in establishing
ships' missions, has resulted in "crash" design efforts for most ship
classes. A review of current project design decisions tends to bear out
each of the identified deficiencies.
The study group approached the topic and generated its recommendations
on the presumption that greater NAVSEA influence at all levels of the OPNAV
decisionmaking process actually can make a difference in optimizing ship
design, development, and performance. A thorough analysis of the process
by which OPNAV establishes its ships requirements is necessary to conclude
whether that contention is indeed valid.
IIIB. The Establishment of Surface Ship Performance Requirements
It is the role of OP-03 within OPNAV to establish force requirements
and ship characteristics for the majority of combatant classes, Inputs 'are
obtained from the areas of combat systems development, tactical development
and evaluation, and operational test and evaluation which are analyzed
primarily through OPNAV's Systems Analysis Division (OP-96). Specific
performance requirements and constraints are developed and communicated
to NAVSEA for the production of ship designs.
There exists no set program in OPNAV for the initiation of new ship
construction projects. Among the ways that the need for a new class of
ship is identified in OPNAV are:62
1) By OP-03 as the result of a) the need to replace old ships (e.g.
the LX/LSD-41) or, b) a major new shipborne weapon system is ready to go
to sea (e.g. Aegis DX, DDG-47).
2) By OP-96 as the result of having examined new threats, translated
them to new missions and scenarios, and having decided that new hardware is
necessary (e.g. DX/DD-963).
3) By the CNO himself as a result of advice by the CNO Executive Board,
other admirals, or anyone else who can influence his thinking (e.g. PF/FFG-7,
SCS, CSGN, CVN-71, FFX).
Over the past two decades the Navy has constructed only ten new classes
of combatant escorts (see Appendix II). With an expected service life for
a given ship type fairly well established (25 to 30 years for most classes
depending upon class value, modernization, and upkeep) there is a service-
wide feeling that the Navy should be better able to anticipate its needs
and establish some type of design and development continuity. It was for
this purpose that the Extended Planning Annex (EPA) was established in the
early 1970s. The objective of the EPA is to help various activities better
to anticipate impending design needs by establishing a schedule of replace-
ment times for active Navy ships. Unfortunately, the EPA does little more
than establish a replacement schedule based upon anticipated obsolesence
of current units in terms of a general service life expectation. There is
no direct correlation to combat subsystem development or anticipated threats.
As such, little guidance is provided to help the future platform designer
anticipate hardware or capability requirements.
Ship design and construction currently takes upwards of seven years.
The problem of being able to anticipate fleet needs even that far into the
future is difficult to overcome in this age of rapid technological advance.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the CG-47, no recent ships have been
commissioned with combat systems that hadn't been designed, built, and
proven prior to the initiation of the platform design. The primary causes
for the last minute design effort that seems to plague each class are the
result of 1) non-technical pressures both inside of and outside of OPNAV
placing constraints on the program unrelated to ship performance, and 2)
the failure of systems analysis to "prove" design value and thereby over-
come arbitrary constraints.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense
In the early 1960s the U. S. Navy's acquisition policies were brought
into DOD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The objective of
the centralized system is to provide for maximum cost-effectiveness by
preventing parallel acquisition programs in the services, providing a systems
analysis approach to the determination of integrated defense requirements,
and providing a DOD review system to redirect or cancel high risk programs
which cannot be brought in under cost constraints.
In order for a Navy ship acquisition program to be carried out, the
project must receive initial and periodic approval by OSD and must be included
in the DOD FYDP. The Navy's overall force planning system is a fairly
extensive process with the objective of obtaining OSD, and more important,
Congressional approval for desired programs.
Approved "major programs" in DOD (i.e. RDT&E costs in excess of $50
million or estimated production costs in excess of $200 million)6 3 must be
documented with Development Concept Papers (DCPs). DCPs are developed for
major milestone decisions in the life of the major program and are reviewed
and updated at each stage of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC). Approval must be obtained from the Secretary of Defense at each
of four DSARC levels in order for a project to proceed.
It is the concern of the OSD offices of Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E) and Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to review Navy ship programs
and to determine whether they adequately fulfill a real military need.
PA&E and DDR&E examine the Navy's analysis, technology, scenarios, and assump-
tions. During DSARC they determine the military value of a force having
the new advanced ship as compared with an alternative force attempting to
accomplish the same mission.64
Although the DOD review process does not appear to have made many signi-
ficant long-range alterations in the Navy's procurement plans it nevertheless
serves as an additional level of analysis and decisionmaking to inhibit long-
range planning efforts. As dependent as ship procurement is on individual
opinion and personality, the turnover of DOD personnel injects new force ideas
which often preclude serious planning on any longer basis than the next budg-
etary cycle. The turnover also presents the problem (experienced throughout
procurement activities) of continually having to educate personnel in the
planning and acquisition process. One DOD analyst has noted with some concern
the fact that the DOD acquisition process for major combat systems is not
well understood by most DOD personnel who are responsible for it.65
Despite the fact that the Navy usually gets what it wants from DOD
(although that "want" is usually oriented to what it thinks it can get includ-
ed in the FYDP) there nevertheless exists an undercurrent of hostility toward
OSD activities at the upper levels of the Department of the Navy. A large
number of senior personnel have never forgiven Robert McNamara for reducing
individual service prerogative in the area of procurement, A widespread
feeling is that OSD is staffed by analysts who have little practical appre-
ciation for defense needs and think strictly in terms of dollars.66
This relationship is exacerbated by the tendancy of OSD to study ques-
tions that many in the naval hierarchy would rather not see brought up. The
individual platform sponsors in OPNAV (the Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare
(OP-02), Surface Warfare (OP-03), and Air Warfare (OP-05) - widely referred
to as the "barons") have traditionally taken assiduous care to avoid ques-
tioning the validity of each others' programs. OSD has often invited hostility
by probing for cost-effective solutions regardless of warfare specialty
(e.g. by questioning the validity of the surface fleet, by investigating the
use of diesel submarines, by analyzing the use of land-based aircraft to
supplement or supplant the aircraft carrier, and by questioning the cost-
effectiveness of nuclear propulsion.)6 7
It is for these, among other reasons, that the Navy has seen its tra-
ditional ally as the service-oriented U. S. Congress rather than the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
The United States Congress
The entire DOD budgetary process involves a number of set steps. The
JCS force proposals are sent to the Secretary of Defense and are then inte-
grated into the proposed FYDP. Individual service program plans are prepared
and correlated into the OSD program. Detailed budget estimates for each
service are consolidated by the Secretary of Defense, OMB, and the President.
The FYDP is then finalized and the first year presented to Congress.
Obviously, program inclusion in the DOD budget does not guarantee that
it will be funded - nor does exclusion from the original budget guarantee
that it will not be. Budget estimates are considered by both the Armed
Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Armed Services committees are responsible
for authorizing legislation to permit appropriations to be made, while the
Appropriations committees are responsible for appropriating the funds. This
wide Congressional program control began with the Military Construction
Authorization Act of 1961 which stipulated that no funds could be appropriated
for defense procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless
preceded by Armed Services committee authorization. By 1963 all R&D carried
out by DOD required such authority. The authority has continued to increase
over the years, and today almost all procurement, all R&D, and military con-
struction are directly authorized by the Armed Services committees before
funds are appropriated.68 The result of this arrangement is that the Armed
Services committee action establishes the maximum amount which may be appro-
priated by Congress. As such, the Navy must not only sell its ship programs
to OSD, OMB, and the President, but its case must be presented to four sepa-
rate Congressional committees as well as to the entire House and Senate.
The increasing interest of the individual committees in military appro-
priations, despite the decline in the DOD budget as a percentage of the
overall federal budget, is indicated by the tremendous increase in the number
of committee hearings conducted since FY 1963. The following figures show the
number of pages of printed testimony for each committee for FY 1963 and
FY 1973:69
Armed Services Committee Appropriations Committee
Senate House Senate House
1963 570 835 1787 3376
1973 4387 2917 5308 8588
Over the years Congress has shown an increasing desire to control not
only the DOD budget but program allocation, This is partly because of Congres-
sional fear that if the Pentagon is left to its own devices, it will keep and
cut all of the "wrong" things.70 Congress has also found that the tremendous
production expenditures involved make good political levers. 7 1
There are a number of factors that work both for and against the Navy's
position in selling ship programs to Congress. The nature of the process of
selection of committee members is such that individual members are aligned
with defense procurement interests (i.e. they often have major defense con-
tractors in their home districts). As each major system has to be sold
individually to Congress, the services have historically found it much more
difficult to sell many different, cheap, limited single-purpose systems -
such as Zumwalt's low-mix options - than to sell a few super-systems that
can do everything. For one thing, the Congressional committees do not have
time to evaluate complex mixes of units, and for another, there is great
sensitivity to knowingly supplying American fighting men with anything but
72the best. An example of this is the 1974 Congressional act (sponsored
primarily by Admiral Rickover through his "special relationship" with Congress)
which stipulated that all combatant ships in the Navy's strike forces be
nuclear powered. Analysis presented in 1975 by OSD "convincingly demonstrated"
that nuclear ships are more expensive to acquire and operate over their serv-
ice lives than their conventional counterparts. 7 3 Other legislative restric-
tions include the Buy American Act which has effectively ruled out considera-
tion of foreign-produced combat systems despite considerations of higher
capability and lower cost.
Congressional decisions have played a major role in many recent ship
classes that the Navy has purchased or considered.
- Congressional bias for large, multi-purpose ships was held responsible
for the death of the SCS concept -- the "key element of the 'low' side of
the spectrum of sea-based air capability, '74 Admiral Zumwalt, the primary
SCS sponsor as CNO, placed a large share of the blame for program cancellation
on Admiral Rickover, whom he accused of interference in design contract
award and a strong anti-SCS lobbying effort in Congress,75
- Congress has been held to blame for a large share of the cost and
size growth of the DD-963. Admiral Zumwalt has noted suspiciously that
Litton's DD-963 construction site is located in Pascagoula, Mississippi -
home state of Senate Armed Services Committee Chariman John Stennis (Zumwalt
also noted an "atmosphere of irregularity" in the fact that Litton's president
- Roy Ash - was a strong supporter of President Nixon, and was later eleva-
ted by Nixon to the position of Director of OMB).76
- Congress has been considered a primary impetus behind the DDG-47 class
in its insistence that the Aegis system complete development and go to sea
on something.77
- The DD-997 - an additional Spruance class destroyer - was author-
ized in FY 1978 at the urging of Senator Stennis for the primary purpose of
keeping the Pascagoula shipyard in work.7 8
- One of the primary considerations in the design of the DDGX has been
that of survivability. Ordinarily this would not have received tremendous
emphasis at the characteristics definition stage, but Congressional charges
of poor survivability in the FFG-7 automatically pushed the question to
prominence in the next ship design.79 As a Litton designer has noted,
"the Navy brass ... take as their goal maximizing naval effectiveness subject
to congressional behavior."80
The Navy has yet to approach its stated goal of 250 escorts to support
fleet operations. With the combined tendencies of Congress to limit ship-
building funds on the one hand, but to demand that the Navy only purchase
the best on the other, the escort fleet has been steadily moving away from
that 250 ship goal. This situation has recently spawned the interesting
concept of the FFX.
Officially, the FFX is to be a very low capability convoy escort for
training and manning by the naval reserve forces, The World War II vintage
destroyers now being used by the reserves are approaching the end of their
service lives. Normally, aging active escorts would be relegated to reserve
use to be replaced by new escorts for the active fleet. But official state-
ments indicate that the predominantly 1200 psi engineering plants of the
current active escorts are unsuitable for reserve operation and that a small
gas turbine derivative (such as CODAG) is preferred. A general feeling
in OP-03 is that the CNO does not really want an escort for the reserves, but
as Congress has traditionally taken the role of guardian of the reserve forces,
this is the best chance the CNO has of getting a large number of austere
platforms past Congressional approval. Congress will put a little "gold
plating" on the ships to bring them up to an active fleet's low-mix capabili-
ty, and then once built, the Navy can integrate them right into active fleet
roles with predominantly active crews.82 This scenario is primarily conjec-
ture from non-decisionmaking personnel, yet such a motive by the CNO could
certainly be considered opportunistic.
One of the most significant cases of factors outside of OPNAV controlling
the development of a ship procurement program is that of the CVN-70 follow-on
project. A major disagreement both within and outside of the Navy ensued
throughout the 1970s as to what the follow-ship to the three ship CVN-68
Nimitz class should be. Admiral Zumwalt as CNO was pushing for the low-
cost SCS - a concept rejected by Congress as lacking in air capability.
Carrier and nuclear forces inside of the Navy, supported by President Nixon,
were pushing for the CVN-71.
NAVSEA began development of the conventional CVV in September of 1972.
The project was abruptly cancelled in early 1973 "... due to fears of the
Navy brass that rumors of the project were jeopardizing the then-current
effort to secure Congressional approval of another large nuclear carrier."83
The CVV project was revived at a low profile in the fall of 1973, but few
people in NAVSEC knew that it was going on. The CVV design, as envisioned
in 1974, was basically 60,000 tons, one half of a CV-67 class conventional
power plant, and a capability for 50 to 60 aircraft.
In August of 1974 Congressional legislation was passed providing that
all combatant ships in the Navy's strike forces be nuclear powered. The CVV
program was aborted and NAVSEA thinking reoriented to a CVN. With the support
of President Ford, the Navy recommended a fourth CVN-68 for the FY 1976 budg-
et. That recommendation was not accepted and the CVNX study group in NAVSEA
looked at a smaller CVN in the fall of 1975. In the summer of 1976, with
presidential support, Congress appropriated long lead funding for CVN-71.
After the 1976 election, President Ford reversed himself and came out in
favor of a smaller fossil-fueled CV. President Carter supported this propos-
al. All long-lead funding for CVN-71 was rescinded by Congress, but no
long-lead funding was provided for the follow-on CV.
In March of 1977 the CVV design effort was begun. Due to time and cost
constraints imposed by the CNO (who was hoping for FY 1979 funding) the ensu-
ing design study was characterized as a "...hectic series ... in a fire drill
mode. '8 4 A three month conceptual design effort was squeezed into six weeks.
But in March of 1977 Congress refused to reprogram funds to enable the CVV
preliminary design to start, so the FY 1979 CVV procurement option was lost.
As one designer summed up the problem, "the majority on the House committee
which had to approve the reprogramming action were large nuclear carrier
advocates who opposed the Congressional majority who favored the CVV."8 5
In the summer of 1977 Congress demanded that the Navy embark on a
comprehensive reexamination of all sea-based platform alternatives. Without
a concept design report ever having been completed, Congress authorized funds
for a preliminary design to begin. Thus NAVSEC was simultaneously studying
the fundamental program concepts while it was conducting specific trade-off
studies.
Menawhile, momentum was growing in Congress for CVN-71, and such authori-
zation was passed in 1978. The FY 1979 budget was vetoed by President Carter,
and the failure to override by Congress resulted in CVN deletion. The
President repeated his desire for a CVV, and in October of 1978 the CNO pro-
posed a modified CV-67 design. In 1979, Congressional debate centered on
a CVV versus a modified CV-67. But once again momentum was growing for a
nuclear carrier, and the President finally acquiesced in CVN-71 authorization
in late 1979.
The NAVSEC aircraft carrier design focus has followed the following pat-
tern since 1974:
1974 CV
1975 CVNX
1976 CVN-71/CVV
1977 CVV/CVN-71/CV-41/VSS/DDV
1978 CVV/CVN-71
1979 CVV/CV-67
1980 CVN-71
Obviously the acceleration, deceleration, starts, and stops of the design
efforts originating in the political arena seriously degraded the effective-
ness of NAVSEC in producing an optimum platform. The standard joke in NAVSEC
was, "Which carrier are we designing today?" 86 Authorization and funds for
long-range planning frequently came unexpectedly and very late - when few
design personnel were available to be assigned to the CV program. Design
managers found themselves losing credibility with the engineers. Since the
engineers didn't expect their work to be used, they made little attempt to
be innovative or creative.8 7
Despite the political machinations it was ultimately intransigience
at the executive level rather than the Congressional level that held up
final approval of the CVN. The Navy got the carrier it wanted (or at least
the one that the aviation and nuclear power factions wanted), and Congress
was the driving force behind the authorization.
There is acknowledgement in the Department of the Navy that some Congres-
sional action worked to the detriment of a number of Navy-sponsored programs.
Insistence on high capability platforms killed the low-mix air-capable ship.
Failure to look at procurement items from a total systems approach has
resulted in force incongruities (thus cancellation of VSTOL aircraft R&D
while a preliminary VSTOL CV project was approved and inadequate authorization
for land-based support for the FFG-7 and PHM). But the naval hierarchy
tends to view these problems as primarily the Navy's failure to sell Congress
on total programs as opposed to individual systems. As one ranking officer
in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy put it, "Congress is the best
friend that the Navy has." 88 The ability of the Navy largely to get what it
wants despite OSD or presidential disapproval is evidence of that.
The Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare (OP-03)
The determination of size, capability, and number of platforms to buy
in a given class is largely the result of an intuitive reasoning process on
the part of OPNAV as to the amount of acquisition money that can be worked
into the DOD budget and sold to Congress in a given fiscal environment. The
tradeoff has generally been between buying a medium number of high capability
ships (favored by Congress) or buying a few high capability ships and a large
number of low capability ships (Zumwalt's "high-low" - favored by OSD).
The result has usually been that the high capability ships price themselves
out of existence (e.g. CSGN and CGN-42), and that the low capability ships
grow in size and cost, until the Navy ends up with a medium number of medium
capability ships (e.g. DD-963) - a result which seems to please no one.
Forces within OPNAV itself played a major role in derailing the high-
low concept in the early 1970s. Admiral Zumwalt was a surface line sailor
whose destroyer background led him to focus on the low capability escort
role and a philosophy that in almost any situation two or more ships are
better than one. Unfortunately he did not share the special relationship
with Congress of Admiral Rickover. Rickover continually preached the doctrine
of modern and capable (i.e. nuclear powered) ships as the only force that could
89fight a real war. His lobbying in Congress around the CNO resulted in the
1974 act requiring nuclear propulsion for all major combatant construction
and, in Zunwalt's view, largely killed the high-low concept.90 Low-mix
came to a stop with Zumwalt's successor, Admiral James Holloway, whose avia-
tion background focused his attention on the carrier strike group with its
high-mix CVN and CSGN as the best options for the future Navy.
A rough determination of the division of the procurement budget in
OPNAV is largely the result of tradeoffs and deals between the platform
sponsors in OPNAV. A true balance of power has been deemed to exist in the
organization, with the primary concern of each "baron" being to maintain his
own prominence in the OPNAV organization.91 The system is accepted as it is
largely because it is felt that the internal competition will produce the
best fleet balance. One result however, is that a lot of analysis that
might "threaten" one of the sponsors is never done, and a lot of the "tough"
questions about the Navy's future are never asked.92 Another result is that
the OPNAV sponsors undertake most of their analytical effort in response to
various administrative and Congressional challenges. The primary analytical
thrust is to justify positions rather than to move ahead into long range
planning. OP-03 introduced the Surface Warfare Plan (SWP) in the mid-1970s
to try and provide central planning focus for fleet development and procure-
ment programs. The SWP is a fairly extensive analysis of fleet deficiencies,
but the long range planning aspects are very limited and the mechanism for
correcting shortfalls does not provide for any degree of coordination with
activities outside of OP-03. The SIWP is more a list of problems than a plan
for providing solutions.
Even within the production constraints that are imposed by Congress,
OSD, and the warfare communities in OPNAV on surface ship design, there is
still a great deal of prerogative left to OP-03 in establishing and trans-
mitting requirements to NAVSEA for development. The primary problem contin-
ues to be the lack of quantifiable measures of effectiveness to bring the
decisionmaking process away from the "arbitrary" and "intuitive" reasoning
that is now used to establish ship characteristics. To be sure, there are
numerous practical problems to trying to quantify performance. A purely
analytical basis for ship design presupposes a knowledge of:
1) The final combat system configuration of the ship being designed;
2) The configuration and tactical doctrine of the rest of the fleet
when the ship enters service;
3) Realistic assumptions about the nature of enemy equipment and opera-
ional doctrine from 7 to 37 years in the future.
Despite the fact that tremendous analytical facilities are available,
and numerous expensive fleet studies are carried out each year, the general
feeling in OP-03 is that any meaningful study would be too complex to carry
out, that arbitrary constraints imposed down the line would negate the
study findings, and that subjective reasoning by experienced operators is a
far better indication of fleet needs. Unfortunately, requirements genera-
tion is often too heavily dependent on the intuition of experts in the
Pentagon navy and seldom reflects information and opinions from current fleet
and force commanders.93 It must be pointed out though, that fleet operating
limitations may preclude the collection of enough meaningful data to make
the exploitation of such a source of information worth the time and expense.
There is no tendency in OP-03 to look at ships designs from an integra-
ted combat systems approach. The triple threat environment - ASW, AAW,
and SUW (Anti-Surface Warfare) - is viewed as three distinct threats, and
the tactical and systems solutions are seen as combat system versus combat
system rather than platform versus platform. Despite official doctrine to
the contrary, OP-03 focus is primarily on improved combat systems in each
warfare area, not on integrated ship configurations with a maximum overall
performance in a fleet environment. Systems integration as it exists, is
limited solely to assuring that various dissimilar subsystems can be connec-
ted and will work together,
The establishment of characteristics for a new ship class begins with
the prioritizing of the three warfare missions - ASW, AAW, SUW. This is
intuitively established in OP-03 by looking at current fleet units and
deciding what the fleet needs more of. For example, the FFG-7 became an
AAW escort because most existing fleet escorts were primarily ASW. It
is then taken as "given" that certain equipments are associated with these
missions. As cost and displacement constraints are imposed on the design,
equipments are dropped from the low end of the warfare mission list until
the desired ship size is achieved. The three warfare missions have basically
the following associated equipments:94
AAW - 2D and 3D air search radars, missile launch and control
systems, IFF, missile fire control system
ASW - sonar, ASROC, torpedoes, ASW helicopter
SUW - surface search radar, gun, gun fire control system
The FFG-7, as primarily an AAW escort, had ASROC deleted from the ship
requirements, was given a low capability sonar, and was fitted with only a
very limited capability gun system. No formal analysis was done to deter-
mine how a 76mm gun would fit into existing fleet operations, or if it would
be even more cost effective to delete the gun, sonar, and torpedoes alto-
gether. It was subjectively determined by individuals in OP-03 that as an
escort, the FFG-7 should carry a gun and some kind of ASW capability.
Although the expressed feeling in OPNAV and NAVSEA is that there should
be an analytical basis for the selection of hardware to fulfill mission
requirements, the limited availability of such hardware largely precludes
that process. Current DOD directives require that combat subsystems be
available and proven prior to finalization of ship design. The objective
is to preclude cost and development time overruns by restricting the intro-
duction of high-risk technology. The requirement has achieved its purpose
in past ship classes, but it severely restricts the options available to
OPNAV in specifying ship requirements in the TLR. For example, if only a
5" gun is available for installation, OPNAV cannot levy the requirement for
anything other than a 5" gun in the TLR. It also makes little sense for
OPNAV to describe the requirements for a specific 5" gun if only the MK-45
5"/54 is available and practical for use. With foreign equipments excluded,
OPNAV has a choice of no more than two or three systems to choose from
in each combat systems category, On each platform it is generally cost
constraint, not performance, that determines which of the two or three
systems is to be used,
Nevertheless, considerations of hull and propulsion generally dominate
requirements decisions while the ship's proposed combat system and concept
of operations are subjectively determined. Most ship mission analysis
doesn't take place until after the platform has entered the fleet.
One result of the "bargaining" approach within OP-03 to establish ship
characteristics is a general failure to look at the ship as a whole unit
and reduce many of the arbitrary constraints which work their way into the
design. Some examples of arbitrary ship characteristics - the basis for
which has not been analytically established, but which have been rigidly
adhered to - include:95
- A 45 day stores requirement
- Endurance to independently transit the Atlantic Ocean at top speed
- Establishment of a maximum weight allowance for military payload
- Selection of a ship's speed
- Establishment of habitability requirements
A review of escort ship ORs and TLRs shows a standard pattern in many
areas that indicates that certain performance requirements were chosen
simply because they appeared that way on the last OR or TLR that was issued.
Possibly in the absence of any analysis to prove the contrary, the TLR
author in OP-03 could not think of any good reason to change performance
requirements such as speed and endurance that had remained constant for years.
The design impact of such criteria are largely unknown to the TLR originator,
and the increased cost for increased performance requirements is never
determined.
One area of seemingly arbitrary requirement establishment that has had
a most profound impact on U. S. warship design is that of habitability. A
NAVSEA study pointed out the following shift in design priorities for U. S.
warships since World War II:96
World War II 1970s
1, Weapons Electronics
2. Propulsion Habitability
Design 3. Electronics Endurance
Priority 4. Endurance Weapons
5. Habitability Propulsion
In almost every warship class in the past three decades, habitability
considerations - primarily in terms of space allotted per man - have con-
tinued to play an increasingly important role in design, Minimum environ-
mental control standards were established by OPNAV in 1965 for all naval
ships.97 The following chart provides some comparison between minimum
standards and space allocated in the DD-963 class ships; 98
Minimum 2 DD-963 Space
Space Rqmt (ft ) Allocated (ft )
Officers' Staterooms 1277 1748
Wardroom 532 702
Crew Berthing 4837 6087
Crew's Mess 882 1086
Crew's Rec Room and Library 140 480
Laundry 373 638
Post Office 68 96
Barber Shop 56 105
All Habitability Spaces 15,651 20,911
Excess Space Allotted 5260 ft2 (33% over the minimum requirement)
In the development of the FFG-7 the CNO termed the 1965 standards as
"outdated", and a revision is now underway in OPNAV. Preliminary indication
is that the minimum standards will be raised still further.99
As more volume has been allocated to habitability, a decreasing volume
and weight has tended to be devoted to military payload. Of the eight most
recent classes of escort ships introduced into the fleet, the FFG-7 ranks
next to last in allocation of weight to payload (9.0%), followed only by
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the DD-963 (8.5%). Habitability review boards are manned predominantly
by fleet personnel who give recommendation to the CNO as to desired minimum
living standards. With no direct platform orientation, there is no under-
standing by board personnel as to what performance trade-offs have to be made
to increase habitability standards. As such, there is little motivation
to investigate austere options which may contribute to overall ship perform-
ance.
The ostensible objective of improving habitability conditions is to
increase crew job satisfaction and thus improve personnel retention. Although
such a connection might "seem" logical, there has been no actual analysis
done to prove that such a correlation exists. On the contrary, motivational
research has indicated that removing items of dissatisfaction from the
working environment does not lead to job satisfaction. The general consen-
sus among fleet operators is that men would rather be valued members of a
well-armed crew with a high prospect for victory than live in comfort on
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a visibly under-armed ship with marginal capabilities, The critical
manning problems that the Navy is presently facing will probably result in
even higher habitability standards. Without analysis to prove the benefit
of this incentive, the Navy many very well be exacerbating its retention
and ship performance problems in its efforts to solve them.
There are, of course, a number of forces which come into play in the
allocation of platform space. Activities outside of OP-03, who often have
little appreciation of the overall ship concept, often wield significant
leverage in reserving some areas on a proposed platform. The Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery has been particularly single out as such an activity.
In the FFG-7 class, lengthy negotiations were conducted in order to get
the Bureau to reduce a demand of 336 ft2 for a medical treatment room to
the 200 ft2 that had been allotted that space in the design.
The general attitude toward the TLR in OP-03 is reflective of its
limited value to the design effort. There is currently no set doctrine
for the assignment of TLR authorship. It might be presumed that most surface
ship TLRs would originate in OP-32 (Surface Warfare Division of OP-03), but
the actual intent in assignment seems to be one of spreading the administra-
tive workload around. One OPNAV division head noted that in his two years
of experience in OP-03 he could discern no set pattern for TLR assignment.102
The original instruction outlining the TLR/TLS system was issued by
OP-97 - the Office of Ship Acquisition and Improvement - and maintained
by that office until its disestablishment in 1974. Cognizance over the
instruction then passed to OP-37 -- Ship Acquisition and Amphibious, MLSF,
Mine, and Special Warfare Division - as a collateral duty, where it has
long since slid into obsolescence. The TLR as it exists is considered more
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of an administrative burden in OPNAV than a useful planning tool. Virtually
everyone in OPNAV who has some interest in ships is on the TLR routing list,
and it literally takes years for the document to work its way through the
system. Those individuals who have authority to make changes to the TLR
tend to feel the obligation to do so - seldom with adequate analysis
or documentation. As a result, the TLR often bears little relationship
to what is actually being designed and constructed. The FFG-7 was commis-
sioned in 1977, yet Change One to the 1975 TLR was still circulating through
OPNAV on its way to approval in late 1979.104
A large measure of this problem is disagreement in OPNAV as to what
the actual use of the TLR should be - whether it is strictly a document
to transmit initial requirements to NAVSEA, or whether it should be main-
tained along with the ship's development to reflect current requirements
and design. At the present time it really does neither - and there is
little confidence expressed in its actual utility.
To a large extent, the administrative organization in both OPNAV and
NAVSEA simply seems to drive itself - often independent of the design
objective. For example, the Concept Exploration Report for the FFG-7 -
which summarizes the basic concept definition, technical tradeoffs, and
rationale leading to the PF characteristics - is officially dated July
of 1971, but was actually written a year later. The document was predated
because the SHAPM determined that a Concept Exploration Report was necessary
for design justification even though it had long been irrelevant.1 0 5
Although OP-03 maintains large staffs to develop required ship charac-
teristics there is little or no input into new ship design below the highest
levels - where decisions are largely based on intuition.1 0 6 The predomi-
nant focus at almost all levels in OP-03, and in OPNAV, is on the production
of platforms and on the production of combat systems as separate units. The
question of overall integration into a ship system is left up to NAVSEA, and
the question of overall integration into fleet operations is left up to the
fleet. The primary function of OP-32 is actually fleet modernization - a
job which reflects the primary procurement philosophy of the surface com-
munity.
Since the beginning of the decline of the escort fleet in the late 1960s,
the predominant thrust in OPNAV has been to produce as many hulls as possible
toward the elusive 250 ship goal. No great emphasis has been placed on
specific combat systems configuration since intransigience in such an area
could jeopardize acquisition of platforms, and because OPNAV has always
figured that it can reconfigure the platforms to whatever it wants once
they are in the water. As such., fleet modernization programs have become
the primary activity in OP-03 and are well established as adjuncts to the
design and acquisition programs.
A major factor in the control of cost and time overruns in the FFG-7
class was strict configuration control. The design plan changes themselves
are tremendously expensive - often more so than the actual equipment changes
that result. It has often proven cheaper to build the ship the "wrong" way
and have a section ripped out and rebuilt later, than simply to build it
right the first time. An early design "freeze" brought the FFG-7 within
cost and time constraints, yet before the first ship was ever completed
the Navy knew that it was not what it wanted as a final product. Each
FFG-7 currently has a $42 million conversion backlog.108 This includes
such items as providing two LAMPS III helicopters and dismantling all three
berthing compartments to make space for the "actual" complement.
Such design changes are most often blamed on changes in mission require-
ments or unforeseen technological developments - but this is seldom the
case. Few configuration changes involve items which were not, or could not
have been anticipated early in the design process. The real problems are
a lack of design continuity, the "rushed" nature of most design projects
which preclude a reasonable analysis of ship requirements and systems inte-
gration, and inadequate communications between the actual decisionmakers.
IIIC. The Use of Systems Analysis in Ship Requirements Derivation
In the area of ship requirements determination it is the objective of
systems analysis to identify various force and platform alternative configu-
rations, and select those which put available resources to their most produc-
tive use. It is established policy of both the Defense and Navy departments
that studies and analyses be used as essential tools of acquisition manage-
ment. 10 9
It is generally recognized that the success of modern warships is much
more dependent upon the successful integration of surveillance, communications,
and targetting capabilities of combined sea, air, and land forces than on
the number of guns or missile launchers placed on any single ship.11 0 Anal-
ysis in the ship derivation process seeks to define specific capabilities
needed to fulfill identified missions and tasks in force operations. This
involves long range planning to outline future naval missions and develop
realistic operational scenarios for force employment. Current and future
force deficiencies are determined in those scenarios, and suitable levels
and mixes of platforms are developed to fulfill identified mission require-
ments. In essence, the goal of systems analysis is to develop an optimum
number and mix of warships specifically configured to carry out defined
tasks.
In practice, most systems analysis is either superfluous to the design
process or is utilized after the ship has been designed in order to identify
a suitable mission for the new platform.
A number of OPNAV divisions carry out varying levels of long range plan-
ning, but OP-06 - Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations - is specif-
ically charged with developing long range force level requirements. The
division charged with using systems analysis to evaluate the relative effec-
tiveness of alternative programs (including ship development programs) is
OP-96 - the Systems Analysis and Long Range Objectives Division. Specific
studies and analyses may be conducted by in-house organizations (within the
Department of the Navy), by affiliated organizations, or by outside organiza-
tions under contract or grant. The organization primarily affiliated with
OP-96 for contracted studies is the Center for Naval Analysis.
The development of valid operational scenarios is based first of all,
on adequate long range plans integrating perceived threats and mission
requirements through the life of a proposed ship class, The primary constraint
on useful long range planning is the inability adequately to assess a threat
level 30, 20, or even 10 years in the future. On the other hand, combat
system development is basically an evolutionary process, and reasonable
assessment coupled with solid analytical technique provides some basis on
which to make a force level/mix evaluation.
It is a generally accepted fact in OPNAV that little meaningful long
range planning is conducted by the Navy. OP-06 does some long range planning
but none of it is done in terms of force structure. OP-96 provides analytical
capability for OPNAV as well as the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and
long range force structure planning is vested in OP-965 - the Extended
Planning Branch. But this division is not a strategic planning office and
no continuous broad strategic studies are carried out. The major problems
are seen as a lack of personnel (OP-965 had only four of seven billets filled
in early 1980) and, more important, lack of CNO attention to analysis of
broad strategic goals. As one OP-96 analyst pointed out, "A lot of people
think they are doing long range planning around here, but nobody really is." 1 1 1
It is the function of OP-965 to generate the annual CPAM (CNO Program
Analysis Memorandum). Each CPAM describes the current FYDP program, identi-
fies Navy issues, and develops alternatives based on the decrement and incre-
ment levels specified in the CPPG (CNO Policy and Planning Guidance). The
CPAMs are then reviewed by the CEB (CNO Executive Board) and the impact of
these alternatives on CNO objectives are identified. The CPAM is developed
to provide the CNO with alternatives for responding to the Defense Secretary's
fiscal guidance. Upon receipt of OSD planning and programming guidance, the
CNO, using the program alternatives listed in the summary CPAM, makes major
decisions and issues CNO program and fiscal guidance for the detailed devel-
opment of the Navy POM (Program Objectives Memorandum),
Ideally the CPAM is generated by the CNO, with analytical support from
OP-96, and reflects his own personal view of Navy objectives and force levels.
In reality, the CPAM is drafted by OP-965 with little or no CNO input and is
112
simply sent up to him for his signature, As such, the CNO uses no formal
documentation process to develop his own mission philosophy with which to
mold Navy programs. The general attitude has developed in OP-96 that over
the past decade or more the CNO has gradually lost touch with broad Navy
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planning functions, Due to the necessity of lobbying for individual
projects, the past few CNOs have tended to get bogged down in narrow issues
- such as the promotion of the CVN - and thus have failed to provide broad
direction to naval project development. It is generally felt that Navy
planning should reflect the CNO's personal policies, but that in most cases
the CNO's policies have never really been formulated or stated. A contrib-
uting problem is the structure of the Congressional appropriation system.
Although DOD establishes a five year defense planning program, Congress
appropriates and authorizes funds annually. As such, long term programs
must be presented and justified by the Navy every year, with complete rever-
sals of congressional attitudes not uncommon. This uncertainty of program
funding is a major factor that works against long range planning and forces
the CNO to channel so much of his time into Congressional lobbying efforts.
Recognition of the long range planning deficiency in OPNAV led Admiral
Hayward, in January of 1980, to establish OP-OOX - a new long range planning
group with a direct tie to the CNO. The objective of OP-OOX is to develop
a meaningful long range planning and decisionmaking capability. It is expected
that the new office will take over the CPAM and other planning documents from
OP-965 and will establish them as a true basis for CNO planning guidance.114
It is significant to note that the CNO's desire to upgrade the Navy's long
range planning capability resulted not in the reorganization of existing
groups, but rather in the establishment of a completely new organization
within his own sphere of influence. This is a strong reflection of the
practical inability of the CNO to effect even a moderate reorganization of
his own offices without facing stringent opposition.
The group primarily charged with the development of force mix/level
analysis for OPNAV is OP-96. Established in 1966 under Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
it turned out the "Major Fleet Escort Study" a year later -- a massive work
which helped to shape all subsequent escort programs, and a study which is
still considered to be one of the major analytical works to be produced by
the Navy. The Major Fleet Escort Study is now considered to be the only
comprehensive work on force analysis to be produced by the division itself.
Serious systems analysis efforts in the Navy date back to the establish-
ment of ASWORG (ASW Operations Research Group) in 1942. Analytical functions
rapidly developed after the war, and in 1962 the primary operations analysis
groups which were affiliated with the Navy -- the Operations Evaluation
Group (OEG), the Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG), and the Institue for
Naval Studies (INS) - were joined into the Center for Naval Analysis at
the University of Rochester. Today, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) is
the primary analysis affiliate of OPNAV and does the majority of force level/
mix analysis for OP-96. As the demands for program analysis have increased,
increasingly larger amounts have been contracted out. Today, OP-96 is pri-
marily a contract administrator, doing little in-house analytical work.115
This is due to a shortage of analysis personnel in OP-96 (despite the number
of operations analysts turned out by the Naval Postgraduate School), and
due to OP-96's preoccupation with dealing with near-term problems -
"reactionary analysis." The major studies that are currently produced,
such as "Sea Plan 2000", are most often responses to specific analytical
challenges from the political arena. As one officer put it, OP-96 is too
busy "putting out fires" on a daily basis to be worried about planning for
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tomorrow.
This lack of involvement in real planning analysis by OP-96 has largely
manifested itself in a lack of direction to CNA and other study contractors.
Under established doctrine, OP-96 analysts are tasked with developing study
programs for CNA. At least 75% of CNA studies must have Navy approval. The
remaining 25% of the study funds and effort are for use in areas determined
by CNA to be of Navy interest. A Navy liaison officer attached to CNA noted
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that definitive direction from OP-96 is almost non-existent. Study topics
are not formally presented to CNA, but through iterative dialogue and sub-
jective determination CNA comes to a consensus of what they think the Navy
wants, and then they submit a program covering those areas, It is seldom
that the Navy disapproves of a CNA study topic, and in those cases, CNA
usually includes those studies in its program anyway. The liaison officer
noted that he could only recall one CNA study proposal in the past year
being turned down by the Navy. In that case the rejection was intitiated
by a low-level operational commander because he had remembered the same study
having been done the year before,
The volume of analysis turned out by CNA is tremendous, but the largest
part of it tends to be general and repetitious - the same basic study, or
an update, being done every year or so - with the same basic results. With-
out any firm guidelines or specific program ties from OPNAV, there is no
sense of urgency to start studies, or even to complete them. An observer of
CNA operations noted that there is some status attached to seeing how long
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an analyst can drag a specific study out. It has also been noted that
CNA civilian analysts lack an appreciation for naval operating conditions
and constraints -- particularly with regard to limitations and capabilities
of available fleet personnel. Past studies have also been criticized for
their predominantly "theological" nature (e.g. Can you have "power projection"
without "sea control"?) with little or no practical value.1 19
The apparent result of this analytical production is an endless flow of
executive summaries from "in-basket" to "out-basket" throughout OPNAV with
no real attempt being made to tie the analysis to any decisionmaking process.
The level of funding that supports CNA alone is adequate justification to
120initiate a critical review of privately contracted analysis. One observer
summed the current value of CNA this way, "If we did away with CNA tomorrow
and used the money to buy two more frigates, the Navy would be a lot better
off." 121 This is an argument that could probably be extended to a number of
Navy offices and affiliates.
The primary question that must be answered is that, given proper direc-
tion, orientation, and tie-in to the decisionmaking process, could OP-96 and
its contractors provide a quality of analysis that would give specific direc-
tion to planners in establishing surface ship requirements (e.g. is it possible
to determine through systems analysis whether, in given operational scenarios,
a 5"/54 gun is more cost-effective than two 76mm mounts on a planned class
of ship)? There are some planners who answer point blank that it is not
possible, and that it is the prime mission of operations analysis to serve
in the reactive mode of decision justification and the fending off of program
challenges by analysis groups in OSD, Congress, OMB, etc.
There are certainly outside constraints which must be considered in the
question. Just as in other OPNAV divisions, OP-96 is "restricted" from
from dealing with studies which might upset the balance of power between the
warfare "barons". The "hard" questions, one OP-96 analyst noted, are not
only not studied, they are never even mentioned in jest. 122
The outcome of any detailed analytical study is directly dependent upon
what goes into that study. For naval force analysis these inputs center
on:
1) Accurate threat assessment and projection;
2) Inputs from existing or developmental technology;
3) Feedback from operational test and evaluation;
4) Realistic tactical operating doctrine,
Threat analysis is obviously the major weak link in the analysis effort.
Nevertheless, the very doctrinaire nature of Soviet naval operations and
acquisition programs, coupled with development times similar to those of U. S.
projects, have resulted in no real surprises having been sprung on U. S. plan-
ners. An adequate lead time of at least several years has always been avail-
able to react to new developments. If this were the only analysis weakness
it would not serve as a major obstacle to valuable study outputs.
Certainly a major problem is the lack of any formal communications link
between OP-96 and the various research laboratories and technical facilities
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that are actively developing new combat systems and platforms. There
exist no reliable means for OP-96 (as well as the rest of OPNAV and NAVSEA)
to know in advance what new technologies and equipment are under development
and going to be available in the time frame of the ship design programs that
124
are under consideration. Despite the many years (even decades) of
development time that go into most combat systems, OP-96 officers have little
official knowledge of what is going on outside of their own office complex
in the Pentagon. They usually deal with new projects as they spring onto the
scene at the last minute - often as configuration changes to an already-
designed ship. Likewise, the feedback from OPNAV and operators back to the
combat systems designers is often minimal. Most new combat systems are designed
in something of a vacuum, with engineers guessing what OPNAV and the fleet
want - regardless of total ship impact -- and the fleet trying to find uses
for the equipment that is actually turned out. Combat systems development
is discussed further in section IIID.
Operational test and evaluation information is virtually non-existant
to the force analyst or designer, because OT&E has never really been performed
on more than a subsystem level. The specific limitations of OT&E are dis-
cussed in section IIIE.
The final input to force level analysis, and generally the focal point
of criticism about the inadequacies of the analytical effort is the lack of
approved or developed tactical employment doctrine. As will be discussed
in section IIIF, tactical development and evaluation is an area which, up
until recently, has received little attention, and is not likely, at least
in the near future, to produce any meaningful operational guidelines. The
result is that combat system designers, ship designers, and force analysts
have been independently developing their own tactical doctrine in which to
design and test their own products. When combat systems and ships arrive
in the fleet, individual operators most often use (or misuse) the systems
based on intuitive application, with little or no knowledge of the design
scenarios. By way of example, the primary tactical formation used by CNA
for the majority of its convoy force mix studies appears in no Navy tactical
publication and is apparently widely unknown to fleet operators and planners.
Due largely to these deficiencies, there are no major fleet force level/
mix studies conducted on a continuing basis which take inputs from all areas
of development and evaluation, and provide analysis useful in force planning
decisions. Although such projects as "Seamix", "Seawar", and "Alternative
Battle Groups " studies have been carried out, the apparent effect of these
programs on actual force decisions or ship design is negligible. Executive
summaries appear, presentations are made, and then the study results slide
into oblivion until someone in OP-96 or CNA decides that it is time to do
the study over again.
A notable study conducted through OP-96 and NAVSEA was the Advanced
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Naval Vehicles Concepts Evaluation reported on in 1978. The objective
of the study was to examine the potential military worth, technical feasibility,
and affordability of various generic classes of "advanced" vehicles for the
Navy of the 1980 to 2000 era. The study was conducted by a group of design
engineers who, with a lack of applicable data, made their own assumptions
about combat systems availability and integration, and operational concepts
of high performance vehicles. The lack of such data, or serious attempts
to generate it, has been one of the major obstacles in the. Navy's attempts
to obtain ANV prototype funding. One of the principal conclusions reached
by the study was that any meaningful analysis is entirely dependent upon
much greater understanding and communication between naval operators, ship
designers, and combat systems engineers,126
As part of the ANV study a major war game was conducted in 1977 at the
Center for War Gaming, Naval War College. Due to the limitations of the
facility (the best war gaming facility that the Navy has), subjective deter-
mination of platform capabilities, and a lack of developed operational con-
cepts, the game was unable to derive quantitative results regarding platform
effectiveness. The program limitations were all known before the game was
run. The war gaming system has no simulation capability (it is a computer-
assisted direct action play) and the Navy has no graphic simulators for
concept evaluation. Since the results were predetermined, it has to ques-
tioned as to why the time and effort were expended in the utilization of the
facility. As one analyst assigned to the war gaming center put it, "It was
good public affairs material for us and for NAVMAT."127
Of course a major force level simulation utilizing all possible inputs
is unlikely to provide the solution to force level/mix problems. All simula-
tions are highly dependent upon the largely subjective inputs of the assigned
analysts. In addition, the sheer size and complexity of a major simulation
can be awesome. In 1965 a computer simulation was developed to model an
air-to-air and air-to-ground battle situation to compare the A-7, F-5, and
F-4 aircraft. The Air Force constructed a huge model which simulated an
entire air war. As a DOD systems analyst explained the results, "It was
so complicated that nobody could really figure out what was going on in the
model... It was a gigantic setup that put forth reams and reams of data, and
there wasn't anybody that could analyze the thing and understand it.,,128
The limitations of simulations are obvious, yet the alternative is to
rely totally on subjective determination of requirements that may not hold
up under rudimentary analytical scrutiny. A good practical example of cur-
rent ship requirements analysis in OP-96 is represented by the FFX concept.
The mission and size of the proposed ship were established in the OR (i.e.
protection of economic strategic lines of communication/one half the size of
and FFG-7). OP-96 determination of combat system requirements consisted
basically of an officer developing a ten minute block diagram of equipments
to fit into his subjective conception of what was needed to counter a generally
(and not entirely accurately) perceived threat.129 When questioned as to
what analysis this notional ship concept would be put through to test the
design, the response reflected both a realization of design constraints well
separated from the analytical community, as well as a recognition of the lim-
itations of the analytical effort in OP-96 - "Why waste time doing analysis
when it's obvious what the ship should look like?"'130
The bureaucratic frustration of the Navy's analytical community in at-
tempting to provide program direction is probably best summed up by one OP-96
branch head who stated, "Sometimes I get the feeling that no one knows what's
going on. It all seems like one big fire drill."1 31
IIID. Combat Subsystems Development
A primary obstacle to greater integration of design effort down to the
combat system level is the preponderant view throughout the Navy - reflected
in combat systems employment doctrine - that successful naval battles are
not a function of integrated fleet operations but rather are, in the most
basic sense, a series of one-on-one, combat system-versus-combat system
engagements. The focus is on creating combat systems that have individual
performance characteristics that exceed those of the enemy, As Rear Admiral
A.R. Gralles, former commander of the old NAVORDSYSCOM put it,
In the air, on the surface, and below the surface,
however glamorous our ships and aircraft, they are in the
final analysis, only launching platforms designed to place
effective weapons systems in the right place at the right
time.
Indeed, the current state of tactical development provides little alter-
native to this view. Even if strong communications did exist between ship
designers and combat systems engineers, it is doubtful whether any more
positive direction could be provided regarding fleet requirements. Individ-
ual combat systems development takes an average of seven years - as long
as the subsequent platform development. Thus it may be over 14 years
before a new combat system appears aboard a new ship (by which time it could
already be obsolescent in relation to the deployed systems of an adversary).
For a useful ship lifetime of 25 to 30 years, a platform may need to be refit-
ted with a new combat system suite two or three times. Planning for future
combat systems adaptability requires either strong insight into anticipated
combat systems requirements and developments, or the factoring of excess
margin into a platform's displacement capacity during its initial design
(an expensive prospect with an uncertain payoff).
On the other hand, the failure to address combat systems development
from an entire ship standpoint is increasingly forcing the ship designer to
make critical choices among very few combat systems alternatives. This often
results in excessive performance in some warfare areas while providing inade-
quate performance in others. Weight alone is not the only critical factor.
One combat system may make demands on ship support facilities such as elec-
tric power, cooling water, compressed airp etc,, to the extent that another
combat system cannot be operated at the same time. As one combat systems
designer has pointed out, combat systems research and development is inherently
an .open-l-oop process that focuses on maximum operational performance goals.
System resource allocation constraints become competing development goals.
Unless externally constrainted, R&D will produce only high capability ship
options. This is a primary reason for the failure to keep low-mix ships
at a low cost while keeping them mission capable,1 32
A commonly-cited example of the divergence of technological development
and operational need is that of the AN/SQS-26 sonar currently installed on
most fleet escorts. A conscious decision was made in the technical community
in the early 1960s to concentrate on the development of active detection
and localization sonar systems at the expense of passive capability. An
extremely high-powered unit, the SQS-26's active detection capability at
even medium ranges does not offset its tendency to serve as a beacon for
enemy submarines. With the predominant sonar search doctrine centering
on passive detection and concealment, the high-cost, high-powered, SQS-26
system has not been assigned a major role in most ASW operational scenarios.
In task force operations - the primary design scenario of all surface
warships - mission deficiencies can be covered by other platforms fitted
with the required high-mix capabilities. But as often as not, modern war-
ships are called upon to operate independently to establish presence in
critical world areas. With the proliferation of cheap, precision-guided
munitions that has occurred in the past decade, the prospect of independent
ship operations with deficient performance capabilities in certain warfare
areas is becoming increasingly risky.
A problem which increased design communications cannot overcome is the
selection of combat systems based on other than performance requirements.
The primary consideration in the selection of the 76mm OTO Melara gun for
the FFG-7 was a gesture toward NATO standardization (and probably a desire
for reciprocity). When development of the originally selected 35mm OTO
did not keep up with the FFG-7 schedule, the fallback was restricted to
other OTO Melara models. The 76mm was purchased as the United States was
pressing to obtain a major Italian commitment in the NATO PHM program. The
gun was given no design priority on the FFG-7 platform, where the primary
selection criteria were minimum weight and low manning requirement rather
than fleet utility, The 76mm met these basic requirements, and the question
of how the gun is to be integrated into the ship mission has largely been
left up to the individual fleet operators,
It is unfortunate that performance consideration has not been the driving
force in the investigation of foreign combat systems capabilities. The
surface-to-surface missile is one area where the U. S. could have benefitted
from a foreign system test and evaluation program. Proven missiles such as
the Gabriel, Exocet, Otomat, and Penguin have been available on the foreign
market for years, yet U. S, ships either carried no SSM capability or modi-
fied surface-to-air systems throughout the years of development leading up
to initial Harpoon deployment in 1977, There is little doubt that congres-
sional restrictions have severely limited fleet performance capabilities
through a narrow selection of production options. Certainly a cost/benefit
analysis of such restrictions with regard to combat systems is long overdue.
One area where combat system/ship designer dialogue would be of value
is in creating a mutual awareness of the environment in which subsystems
must operate. As one ship designer has pointed out, it remains to be seen
whether or not today's low-manned, highly-automated, complicated systems
will have as high a reliability as the less sophisiticated and more rugged
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systems of the past. Subsystem designers often seem to lose sight of
the fact that their hardware must be operated by a Navy crew in a hostile
shipboard environment. Excellent examples of this exist in the ASW field
where crew training is a primary adjunct to equipment performance. Lack
of funding and time for necessary schools, coupled with inadequate exercise
time and a high personnel turnover rate has rendered such systems as passive
LAVA all but useless on many platforms. No doubt a fine piece of equipment
in the laboratory, it does little more than take up space in many ships.
A concept which has been circulating through OPNAV and NAVMAT for
some time as a possible solution to the problems of combat suite obsolescence
and limited mission capabilities is that of Seamod. Seamod is a concept of
modularized combat systems which ideally could be dropped in and pulled out
of an accomodating platform to allow a quick retrofit of a new or necessary
weapon system. The concept itself appears promising, but the practical
development problems have stifled any real progress. As Seamod critics
have pointed out: 1 3 4
1) It has not been adequately demonstrated that the decreased costs of
systems modernization will offset the increased development and acquisition
costs of modularized units.
2) We cannot estimate combat systems needs up to 30 years in the future,
let alone estimate the space, weight, and power margins that will have to
be designed into module platforms.
3) We cannot even adequately interface the few combat systems elements
that we have today. We are nowhere near having systems that "plug in."
Certainly the problems are great, but some NAVSEA designers feel that
Seamod is not developing simply because no one is really trying to put
all of the pieces together and make it work. It is widely viewed as a
high R&D and high risk program - concepts anathema to today's procurement
and design communities.135
IIIE. Operational Test and Evaluation
Under current DOD acquisition policies test and evaluation must serve
as the basis of development and production decisions. T&E is charged with
providing the best information possible concerning the military utility of
a prospective system, its operational effectiveness, and its operational
suitability - including reliability, organization, and doctrine and tactics
for system deployment, Established policy calls for a development program
based on periodic performance demonstrations. The pacing function in all
programs should be demonstration of actual achievement of program objectives. 136
The concept of "independent evaluation" is a basic requirement for
providing information for acquisition milestone decisions. OPTEVFOR (Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation Force) is the independent test and evaluation
organization for the Navy which assesses operational suitability for candi-
date and production systems. In OPNAV, T&E policy and guidance are exercised
through Director, RDT&E (OP-098). T&E staff support for Director, RDT&E is
provided by the Assistant Director RDT&E (OP-098c) and the T&E Division
(OP-983). COMOPTEVFOR is assigned concurrent duty as OP-098c.
Aside from production decisions, systems OT&E should provide valuable
input into the planning process by identifying actual systems performance
parameters for force level tactical analysis. A major shortcoming in force
analysis has been the lack of comprehensive and reliable data as to how combat
systems actually operate in a fleet environment.
The current OT&E process in the Navy has been strongly criticized for
its failure to provide support in these critical areas. With the necessity
of having to commit funding to program development years in advance, and
with little latitude to shift sizeable sums of money between appropriations,
program development decisions have not proven flexible enough to be dependent
upon T&E decisions. In a survey of DOD's practices in OT&E, the GAO criti-
cized the Navy for continuing to conduct full-scale OT&E will after systems
have been deployed, when information on operational effectiveness should be
available from operating forces.137
Systems are often sent to the fleet for a determination of performance
capabilities long after they have been in full-scale production. In some
cases, such as the Harpoon missile (in which over-the-horizon targetting is
a long way from being realized) this is unavoidable without seriously detract-
ing from fleet capabilities. But in the majority of cases it is the result
of a continued inability to establish exactly what T&E is supposed to deter-
mine, and exactly how it is supposed to determine it,
Operational evaluation is limited almost exclusively to single system
evaluation in operational scenarios and tactical employment often arbitrarily
developed by OPTEVFOR. It is agreed by most designers and operators that
total evaluation should be conducted in a ship systems environment and a
battle group environment, but there exist no published guidelines for the
establishment and conduct of fleet exercises to carry out such evaluations.
As will be discussed in section IIIF, tactical employment doctrine is far
from established, and lags platform deployment by decades.
Of more immediate concern to OPNAV and OPTEVFOR is the fact that the
planning and conduct of OT&E requires the expenditure of scarce resources
such as ship and aircraft operating time, targets, ordnance, instrumentation,
and manpower. An investigation conducted in 1974 on the feasibility of
conducting a total ship Operational Appraisal of USS Virginia concluded
that it would be a truly mammoth undertaking in terms of money, time,
material, and fleet units. There would also be a high risk that variables
such as crew training, environment, and material readiness that existed
at the time, would be likely to influence the outcome and cause erroneous
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conclusions to be reached.138 Fiscal limitations already result in a less
than optimum level of training readiness. The CNO has determined that 21
days of ship steaming time per quarter is the desired optimum, with 16 days
considered necessary for minimum training. In 1978 an average operational
139tempo of only 14 days per quarter was budgeted. With most ships unable
to meet minimum training standards, little time is left over for systems
T&E. In certain systems, such a sonar, crew training plays a much greater
role in systems capability than the equipment itself. Thus, although a
realistic view of performance can be attained, optimum equipment performance
usually cannot.
The assessment that seems to have been reached by most experts is that
T&E at the battle group level and the total ship level are not cost effec-
tive. In March of 1978 the Navy conducted a complete system follow-on
OT&E exercise on USS Virginia (CGN-38), The estimated cost of the exercise
exceeded $5 million (less than 10% of which came from CGN-38 program acqui-
sition funds). By the time the report was completed, two of the three follow
ships of the class had already been delivered to the Navy and the combat
systems equipment for the remaining ship had already been bought,140
There is also a tendency to perform initial T&E on developed systems
and then provide no meaningful follow'-up after system deployment. As such,
we have no assessment to determine how operationally suitable our deployed
systems are as the threat changes, as our weapons inventory changes, and as
equipment modifications are made. Such assessments could provide valuable
direction to planners of future systems and tests. Contributing to this
discontinuity in test and evaluation is the fact that at nearly every level
of naval organization different offices are responsible for systems mainte-
nance than those that supervised the original acquisition, There seldom
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seems to be any transfer of operational data between the two offices.
Although the primary objective of OT&E is to generate assessments of
operational effectiveness and military worth, OPNAV has taken little part
in providing direction to this effort. It is OPNAV that identifies the need
for a system and its OR, but responsibility for integrating OT&E with each
program is left to OPTEVFOR and the program manager. As one NAVSEA test
engineer sees it, OPTEVFOR considers OT&E as much of an art as a science.
The principle (sic) value derived is often unplanned,
resulting not from the stated objectives but from the
realistic conditions that are interjected. It would appear
that this approach to OT&E would better be 2 ssified as
random experimentation than controlled T&E.
In the absence of OPNAV direction, criteria for T&E are often based not on
any real operational need but rather "nice to have."14 3
The deficiencies of OT&E have not been adequately addressed in OPNAV
primarily because no one in OPNAV seems to know exactly what the testing is
expected to accomplish. As one observer has put it, "The paradox of military
planning is that it must be reasonably precise to quite imprecise future
contingencies."144 Without having any operational tactics or operational
scenarios developed, OPNAV is content to let the design engineers and fleet
operators assume responsibility for equipment performance. The pervasive
attitude in OPNAV continues to be that war itself is the final testing
mechanism. When war occurs, we can determine our exact deficiencies. Until
that time, the priority is on getting hulls and equipment into the water.
IIIF. Tactical Development and Evaluation
The one area that has served as the focus of criticism of ship and
combat system designers, and force planners is that of tactical development
and evaluation (Tac D&E) in the U. S, Navy. The inability to develop valid
operational scenarios for force planning and testing, and the inability to
develop suitable measures of effectiveness for systems tradeoff is generally
blamed on the failure to develop adequate employment doctrine.
The claim is certainly not without basis. The lead ship of the FFG-7
class was launched in 1976, yet the Navy's Tac D&E program for 1979 included
a project to outline the FFG-7 capabilities and missions -- including a
145description and list of capabilities of individual equipment and weapons.
In addition, the project tasking called for the development of preliminary
tactical information for ship employment in AAW, ASW, and SUW engagements.
The FFG-7 was developed primarily for convoy escort duty. An additional
project in the FY 1979 Tac D&E program called for the development of tactics
to employ surface combatants for ASW protection of merchant ship convoys,
amphibious groups, and underway replenishment groups. In a multi-billion
dollar acquisition program it seems that such questions would have been
addressed and settled prior to the initiation of the ship design. How did
the Navy know that it needed the FFG-7 if it didn't specifically know what
it was going to do with it? The situation reflects a common fleet complaint
that the arrival of new systems (and ships) are often a surprise to all
concerned and are usually followed by a flurry of activity to devise ways
to use them.146
Historically it has been OPTEVFOR which has been tasked to determine
performance parameters of new weapons systems and to develop initial employ-
ment doctrine. But OPTEVFOR provides only a baseline doctrine for one-on-
one combat system matchups. Little investigation is initiated into system
performance in task group scenarios, OPTEVFOR project officers designing
tests to evaluate new systems are unable to utilize fleet approved tactics
- even for deployed equipment -- because little fleet approved tactics
exist, "For any given tactical problem," noted one OPTEVFOR officer,
"tactical guidance ranges from nonexistent to hopelessly voluminous, from
clear to contradictory, from specific to general, from creative to pro-
cedural."1 4 7 Although the Navy's Tac D&E effort has produced significant
amounts of tactics on paper, it "... has yet to produce comprehensive or
coherently organized tactical guidance for the fleet. Nor has it produced
a clear game plan for achieving this goal." 1 4 8  It has been observed that
OPTEVFOR has played a dominant role in Tac D&E mostly by default.1 4 9
There is much disagreement even in the fleet as to what tactical doc-
trine should consist of. At the present, performance parameters are collected
for many fleet combat systems and the observed data provided to unit command-
ers for individual digestion and subjective correlation. To many operators
this is seen as adequate support. But many officers feel that this approach
produces information that is too voluminous and disjointed to be adequately
understood, and that resultant employment doctrine is too subjectively
developed over extremely short periods of time to result in anything approach-
ing optimal employment. There has been a growing argument over the past
decade for the establishment of a system of analytic and procedural tools
for the execution of sound tactical decisions.
High level recognition of the problems of tactical development resulted
in major study efforts in the early 1970s to develop ways to identify and
tackle the perceived problems. It was noted that a profound interest in
tactical employment that existed in World War II had considerably waned by
the 1970s. This was due, among other things, to increasingly complex combat
systems, lack of adequate battle experience to test concepts, and, in the
absence of war, a drift of command attention to other areas of readiness.1 5 0
It was noted that new technology had come to be thought of as the primary
solution to continuous variations in the threat. Major programs had been
developed for defining new weapons systems, but no formal mechanisms existed
for the development of new tactical applications and the translation of
exercise analyses and data into improved tactical procedures for operational
employment of these technological products,1 5 1
Fleet exercises were recognized as the best objective measure of U. S.
naval capability short of war. But with a large spectrum of organizations
competing for fleet exercise time and data, and a severe limit on operating
time, fleet exercises concentrated almost exclusively on basic training and
evaluation of unit readiness rather than tactical evaluation. There were
few comprehensive programs, and exercise analysis remained relatively
qualitative. Of the exercise evaluation that was done, it was noted at
the time that, "The volumes of those reports tend to stand in isolation
as heavy labors, unnoted, unread -- certainly unstudied - and leading to
nowhere.,,152
Although a good substitute for costly fleet exercises, little use had
been made of tactical simulators. The electronic war gaming facility at
the Naval War College is primarily a training device, more suited to
strategic studies than to simulation of tactical problems. Extensive use
had been made of computer simulations by contract agencies, such as CNA,
but such studies tended to be limited in scope, of short duration, lacking
in any operational fleet input, and totally dependent upon tactical doctrine
devised by the individual running the simulation.
A major source of tactical deficiency was noted to be inadequate train-
ing of officers rotating into fleet staff billets. A comprehensive study
of factors inhibiting improvement in fleet tactical performance came to
the following conclusions:15 3
1) The inherent complexity of the warfare problem exceeds the quali-
tative capability of staff officers to comprehend fully and interrelate
the many environmental, operational, and hardware variables,
2) The assignment of officers inadequately educated in tactical con-
cepts to fleet staff billets coupled with the necessary rotation of experi-
enced personnel significantly degrades staff capability. The resulting
staff performance contributes to the pattern of recurring discrepancies
and limited tactical innovation.
3) Improvements in training programs to eliminate chronic, recurring
operational discrepancies are inhibited by lack of clear, functional respon-
sibilities among fleet, type, and training commands.
Up through the 1960s, the Naval War College was the only higher educa-
tional institution in the Navy that could be expected to provide the basis
for the tactical thinking needed to cope with the changing naval threats.
But by the early 1970s the curriculum and published papers showed an increas-
ing orientation toward the geopolitical, strategic, and economic rather
154than the tactical. Limited information was produced relevant to the
tactical development process, As a result, critics held that fleet exer-
cises were being planned hy staff officers who were not functionally equipped
for the job. 1 5 5
The predominant attitude outside of the operational forces was that it
was fundamentally the job of the fleet to develop its own tactical doctrine.
The commander of the First Fleet noted in 1971 that it was expected of
operating personnel to; 1) create tactics; 2) design efficient operating
tests; 3) record data; 4) reconstruct and analyze fleet exercises; and 5)
constructively update tactics and rewrite operational procedures. "Financial
support to the fleet in these tasks has been minimal, and provided on a
short term, ad hoc basis."1 5 6
A 1972 synposium of the Office of Naval Research identified the objec-
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tives of Tac D&E as:
1) The development and improvement of tactics; and
2) The provision of data on fleet performance of systems as an input
for defining technical requirements and performing issue analysis.
The causes for the inadequacy of Tac D&E up through 1972 were identified as:
1) Failure to treat it seriously;
2) Lack of communication and coordination between personnel involved in
Tac D&E; and
3) Inadequate direction and support from senior managers in OPNAV and
in the fleet.
In July of 1973, as a result of identified deficiencies, a CNO instruc-
tion established an inter-type Tac D&E program in the Navy and assigned
Tac D&E to OP-095 (Director, ASW and Ocean Surveillance Programs). To carry
out this assignment, the Tactical Readiness Division (OP-953) was created.
The term "inter-type" was meant to restrict Tac D&E activities to
interactions between different types of platforms in relatively large size
fleet engagements. This restriction was made so that the warfare codes
OP-02, OP-03, and OP-05 would not lose jurisdiction over their respective
platform interests (i.e. "intra-type"). The program objective was the devel-
opment of tactical doctrine for optimum employment of weapons systems (in
addition to OPTEVFOR tactical efforts).
Although a large planning organization was set up, and funds channelled
in, there has not been a great deal of evidence that significant strides
have been made in the Tac D&E effort up through 1980. The primary problems
that continue to plague the program are;
1) Lack of command attention at all levels; and
2) The continuing inability to quantify the basic objective.
In 1972 the president of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Stansfield
Turner, "reintroduced" tactics into the curriculum - a subject that had
last appeared by name in 1958. Turner's objective was to deemphasize
information on functional naval warfare and concentrate on those aspects
that would enhance a student's capabilities for making sound tactical decisions.
Although the objectives were clearly stated, the changes have not been marked.
Current tactical courses tend to have a generalized planning and employment
focus of a very basic nature. Naval Warfare Publications seldom appear in
the course reading lists (.perhaps reflecting the general opinion that the
NWP series provides very limited tactical guidance), and the gaming facili-
ties (even with the electronic system update) are no more amenable to tacti-
cal studies and evaluation. Although only partial lists of student research
projects and reports are maintained by the War College, a review of the
reports kept on file (those considered "important") indicates little interest
in tactical subjects. A recent requirement has been levied that most stu-
dents undertake some tactical research during their course of instruction.
The general attitude of the Naval War College staff indicates a very
broad interpretation of tactical training responsibility. As one senior
officer put it, "the War College is not a 'technically-oriented postgraduate
school, nor is it a super-TAO (Tactical Action Officer) course. The objec-
tive here is to stress force planning for the fleet, task force, and task
group commander."1 60 Although it was recognized that a large gap existed
between the lowest and highest levels of tactical instruction in the Navy,
it was not felt that the War College was the facility to take up the slack.
One senior instructor noted that,
Many lieutenant commanders look me up when they leave
the War College and tell me that they don't know any more
about fighting a destroyer than they did when they entered.
Of course not! Tactical employment at that level is not
our objective. We are not trying to prepare tM for their
next tour, we are preparing them for a career.
The only other significant training course in the Navy for tactical
employment doctrine has continued to be the TAO school. This is primarily
a department head level course for middle grade lieutenants. It has a narrow
technical focus on mostly single platform operations and no real Tac D&E input
or investigation. The recognition of major gaps in tactical training - for
junior and senior officers - has led to the recent concept development of
an expansive TAO program to cover the entire surface line officer's career.
This is being coupled with a newly devised tactics curriculum at the Naval
Postgraduate School. The effectiveness of these programs will be several
years in the judging.
The new Tac D&E organization undertook a complete reorganization of the
tactical publication system. A new and expansive numbering system was
devised which incorporates planned publications of detailed systems perform-
ance analysis of both U. S. and enemy units, The project is a truly massive
one. Even though little new information or analysis has appeared or is
planned, those involved with the program express skepticism about chances
for its ultimate completion. For the foreseeable future U. S. tactical pub-
lications will probably continue to be a "... disjointed ... and unmanage-
able collection of documents which sometimes overlap or contradict and are
rapidly becoming too numerous to be read or digested."J 62  The primary thrust
continues to center on publication of raw performance data. The correlation
and establishment of published tactical doctrine awaits further infusion of
staff and funding.
Although OP-953 was heralded as a major step in the development of fleet
tactical doctrine, it currently appears that such development may be a long
time in providing any new products for fleet or analytical use. The OP-953
staff complains of funding and manning deficiencies and, up until recently,
a lack of authority or visibility (in 1979 OP-953 was upgraded to a flag
billet under Rear Admiral Allen E. Hill - specifically to give it more
authority and emphasis in the OPNAV organization). The predominant concept
held by OP-953 is that they are primarily a clearinghouse for tactics initia-
ted at the fleet level. The basic principle of Tac D&E, as one officer
pointed out, is that "Tactics for the fleet must be developed by the fleet." 163
Baseline tactics for new equipment are still the responsibility of OPTEVFOR,
with OP-953's charter giving them evaluation responsibility only for platforms
and equipment that have been operationally deployed (i.e. concepts that are
7 to 40 years old).
This continued reliance on fleet performance and fleet initiated tactics
presents something of a paradox. OP-953 evaluates fleet exercises but has
no input to their planning - nor does it want such input. While relying on
the operating forces for tactical innovation, the predominant feeling remains
that the fleet is a major weak link even in tactical practice and evaluation.
Although OP-953's stated mission is fleet support, no one in the division
really seems to expect any more out of the fleet than has been produced since
World War II.164
In the absence of actual combat, a variety of inspections, examinations,
and management programs have arisen to help facilitate maintenance of fleet
readiness. In this profusion of staff authority, tactical readiness was long
lost in the shuffle. It has been pointed out that many commanding officers
have been relieved of command for failing engineering examinations (even
though their ships could still get underway and operate) but that none have
been relieved for tactical incompetence. There is no test for tactical com-
petence. In the atmosphere of "... bean-counting and card-punching require-
ments ...burgeoning staffs, dwindling operating forces, and prolonged peace-
time operations,"165 little interest has been demonstrated in tactical pro-
ficiency at any fleet level.
With a preoccupation with near term problems, tactical employment is a
topic that is usually brought up in the minutes just prior to the commence-
ment of a fleet exercise. As a practical activity, fleet exercises are seldom
more than training exercises for a ship's officers and crew, and usually cen-
ter on the primary objective of not embarrassing the ship in the presence
of the force commander. So little underway time is available, and submarine
and aircraft services so scarce, that the opportunity to run several itera-
tions of a problem does not exist. New or experimental tactics are seldom
considered, and the entire subject of tactics is immediately dropped when
and exercise is over. It is a topic that is seldom discussed and almost
never initiated by the commanding officer (due largely to most commanding
officers' lack of familiarity with their own ships' high technology combat
systems). "Talk to fleet officers about tactics, and there is mostly the
responding awkwardness of men who wish they had though more about them."166
Severe fleet operating limitations and the fleet preoccupation with
material and administration over operations is understood in tactical sup-
port organizations (many of whose staff officers are newly rotated from
fleet billets), yet they cling tenaciously to the idea that tactics is basi-
cally a fleet responsibility.
There are, to be sure, some hopeful signs in the Tac D&E field. Inter-
est and attention by both the fleet and the CNO have steadily been growing.
New tactical training courses have been developed which may spur interest
and innovation in the field, and methods are being devised to rate command-
ing officers in tactical proficiency (just as they are rated on personnel
retention). But despite these advances, even OP-953 admits that Tac D&E
can never achieve the prominent fleet position that it requires without
a commensurate reduction in other fleet inspections, examinations, and admin-
istrative requirements. Queried as to when Tac D&E will be the preeminent
fleet concern, one senior staff officer in OP-953 replied, "Not before I'm
retired, dead, and buried."16 7
Although the recent OPNAV focus has been on promoting tactical effort
and interest, the flurry of activity has served effectively to mask the
real problem of Tac D&E - that of developing a suitable definition of
platform, intertype, and intratype tactical doctrine. To date, the offices
and units involved in Tac D&E have continually emphasized their role of
collection and correlation, but have passed on responsibility for tactical
development because there is no clear understanding of what it is that is
trying to be developed.
Only one ship class in the fleet - the FF-1052 Knox class - has an
OPNAV approved platform tactical manual. With its appearance in 1979, the
manual lagged ship introduction by some ten years. More such manuals are
planned, but it is not expected that every ship class will ever have one,
nor is it expected that the introduction of the manuals will approach the
fleet introduction of the ship by less than five to ten years.168 Aside
from a general lack of funds and staff to produce the manuals, the reason
given for the laggard development is that fleet operations must be observed
and evaluated before tactics can be devised. This is an admittedly curious
explanation. Combat systems development leads the host platform by a
minimum of about seven years. With a seven year ship development time,
another ten years for tactical manual promulgation results in a 24 year
delay in official operating procedures following initial system conception
(that is if the manual is produced for the class). A review of the FF-1052
tactical manual reveals that it is little more than a general information
book on combat systems parameters - a compilation of the various combat
system technical manuals, the Ship's Information Book, and the ship's Weapons
Doctrine. As one CIC officer described it, "It's great for studying for a
SWO board (Surface Warfare Officer's oral examination), but it has no
practical use."
It was obvious that OP-953 felt the necessity of producing something
by way of tactical guidance, and a publication that should easily precede
a ship class into construction appearing 15 years after the fact is the
result.
What OP-03, NAVSEA, and systems analysis activities want from the
Tac D&E effort is approved tactical doctrine for developing operational
scenarios, and valid measures of effectiveness to make cost/performance
tradeoffs. In the FF-1052 platform tactical manual itself, OP-953 provides
four different viewpoints of what tactics can be (from combat systems per-
formance information to established operating doctrine) and selects none
as the desired goal or model. Experience has shown that once that first
step is taken toward providing operational doctrine of varying combinations
of combat systems, platforms, and threat levels, the degree of problem
complexity rapidly approaches infinity. Subjective decisions must be made
at every step, and it is considered far easier (and safer) to leave those
decisions up to the individual commanding officer. Nevertheless, any effort
to achieve an optimum performance level for various combat systems requires
some forethought and the establishment of basic operational guidelines.
What is necessary is for the concerned OPNAV offices and fleet representa-
tives to develop a concept of what can feasibly be attained by way of Tac
D&E. There is no lack of criticism of the current state of fleet tactics,
but there is also no clear idea of a solution, or indeed of which way to
go.
Certainly much more emphasis on tactical training and readiness is
needed at all levels. Tactical development should be the preeminent concern
of all staffs and operating units. At the same time, a consensus must be
reached as to the practical limitation of tactical doctrine development.
In areas where operational scenarios can be developed for combat system and
platform tests, tactical simulators should be utilized for the iterative
studies rather than total reliance upon the fleet. Where valid operational
scenarios cannot be developed, then other methods of evaluation (quantitative
of qualitative) will have to be devised.
In all cases, a strong communications link from OP-953 to OP-03,
analysis facilities, the technical design community, research labs, and the
fleet is an absolute necessity to establish program guidelines and to maintain
a central focus on project objectives and limitations. At the present time,
NAVSEA presumes that OPNAV can provide quantitative performance evaluations
and measures for design tradeoffs - just as NAVSEA can provide the dollar
figures. Everyone in OPNAV seems to know that they are very limited in the
tactical guidelines that they can produce, but no one is willing to admit
it. At the same time, most fleet officers seem to feel that extensive
tactics have been developed for the testing and introduction of new systems,
and that these guidelines have simply not been promulgated for operational
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use. Everyone is looking somewhere else for the solution. No one, it
seems, is addressing the real problem.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
The inevitable response that one gets in presenting ship design prob-
lems is "So what? - the Navy ultimately gets its ships and Congress gets
to build them where it wants." One former head of an OPNAV ship's charac-
teristics board want so far as to state that the current design process is
probably the best that can be expected - that it consistently turns out
170the best ships that the Navy can buy. This may be true, but the results
of most ship design efforts do not convincingly support the argument.
With the explosion of new technology in the post-World War II decades,
the Navy is now in the unique position of having to make very discriminating
choices about which of a multitude of paths of research and development
to follow. Up through World War II it was hardly possible to envision a
combat system or platform that could not be afforded in reasonable numbers.
There were no parallels to the CSGN or B-1 and no need for a procurement
strategy such as "high-low" mix. In the present day only a small number of
potential R&D paths can be funded. Combat systems development is basically
evolutionary, but with development periods of up to 20 years it takes a great
deal of intuition to guess where the payoffs are going to lie (both in terms
of operability and in adequately meeting the threat). It is increasingly
difficult to be able to project threats far enough into the future to be
able to plan adequately now.
Congress and OSD are increasingly hesitant to fund technology for its
own sake, with the presumption that a utility will become evident down the
line. A good example of this is the SES. No one really knows what the
operational advantages of a 100 knot platform are (particularly in light of
high maintenance requirements and development costs), but OP-03 continued
to forge ahead with the program because the new platform dimension could
possibly prove promising in the future (and also because of a growing fear
in OP-03 that technological developments are leaving the surface fleet behind).
As a result of these funding dilemmas, most factions in the ship devel-
opment process are content to let the current system churn along as constraints,
pressures, and biases from countless sources mold the final product. An
advantage of this system that should not be minimized is the unpredicta-
bility of our development process for our enemies. We know that another
power cannot design to counter our fleet capabilities 20 years down the
road because we cannot anticipate those capabilities ourselves.
The argument is also put forward that it really makes no difference
what our ships are like as built. The only true test of design is combat,
and we can "fix" our ships to meet the real threat when war breaks out.
But history does not lend pratical validity to this contention. Certainly
there were many reconfigurations of warships during World War II, but every
major combat system used during the war was designed and developed prior
to the war's outbreak. With a minimum development time of five to seven
years there is little prospect of developing and deploying new combat sys-
tems to counter wartime threats. The only development that simulated a
tremendous technological breakthrough in the Pacific war (other than the
atomic bomb) was the introduction of the kamikaze. No effective defense was
known or developed, and only its late entry into the war prevented it from
playing a major role in deciding the outcome. Failure of the United States
to plan now to predict and counter such a technological breakthrough could
prove disastrous in a future war. It is no longer a feasible option to
sit back and see what happens. With all of the limitations of threat
analysis and operational scenario development considered, it is clearly
important that every effort be made to predict and design the systems now
that we will need at the turn of the century.
Our development process has also assumed that a force designed to
fight a NATO war in battle group operations is capable of handling any
lower level of conflict. This contention is increasingly coming into ques-
tion - particularly in light of the recent massive proliferation of cheap,
precision-guided munitions.
A classic example of constrained design leading to a marginally useful
ship class is considered to be that of the USS Dealey (DE-1006). Envisioned
as a low-cost, mass-produced ocean escort class, the ships were built for
a mission they were never assigned, and were found unacceptable for anything
else.1 71
The Spruance and Perry classes are more recent examples of such potential
mistakes. The versatility of the DD-963 hull has been widely hailed as a
tremendous planning decision, Yet such a claim does not correspond with
the facts of its development, The hull configuration and design margins
were driven by power plant considerations (i.e. the size of the LM-2500
gas turbine) as well as arbitrary decisions by Litton designers, If the
Navy had clung to its conceptual DX design, it is likely that the Aegis
system would still be looking for a suitable hull. The Spruance class
as it stands is decidedly oversized, overpowered, and underarmed. The
only seriously considered combat system modification - the 8"/55 gun -
appears to be dead, and it remains to be seen whether the relatively small
crews will be able to maintain the ships in a high state of readiness.
Nevertheless, the hull has proven itself to be highly versatile and it will
probably serve as a good basic platform for combat systems modification
into the next century,
At the other end of the spectrum, the FFG-7 was a highly constrained
design with virtually no growth margin. Since the combat system was lowest
on the design priority list, it remains to be seen whether the Navy is not
commissioning another Dealey class,
Both ship classes (the DD-963 and FFG-7) have been well-received by
the fleet, and, with the possible exception of maintainability, both have
received good performance marks. But it must be emphasized that the ulti-
mate performance of either class was not predetermined by any systematic
analysis during the design phase.
It currently appears that problems of design constraints are going to
get tougher before they get any easier. The primary design consideration
of cost is rapidly being replaced by a crisis of personnel availability.
It is not unlikely that future ship acquisition programs will be based on
"design-to-manning" as well as "design-to-cost". Right now the operational
limitations of the manning inadequacies that exist do not seem to be fully
appreciated at the higher planning levels (e.g. the project manager for the
CG-47 class, upon being informed of an expected lack of adequate personnel
to man his ships, brushed the problem aside with the suggestion that merce-
naries be hired).172 As such, the need to supplant men with higher capabil-
ity (and more expensive) systems may not be realized until a crisis is at
hand.
It obviously is desirable to optimize warship performance (within
cost and manning constraints) to ensure that we are making a good long-term
investment with our funds, The question is, to what extent is performance
optimization possible?
Many of the development problems outlined in this study may well prove
to be practically insurmountable, The development of rigid operational
scenarios and measures of effectiveness for platform analysis are too depen-
dent upon subjective input and are too complex to be able to provide defini-
tive design solutions. But it is equally obvious that the personnel and
facilities that are currently available at all levels are not being effectively
utilized to achieve the primary objective of analytically narrowing design
choices so that the best ship can be designed for the money. In every case,
the acquisition system does not produce ships, but rather warships are a
byproduct of the system's operation.
The primary obstacle to achieving a development process based on objec-
tive analysis lies not in the limitations of the analytical process, but
rather in the complete subordination of the design and operational communities
to political decisionmakers. Tremendous numbers of studies are done and
volumes of analysis generated in the name of ship requirements derivation.
But in each instance, the few substantive decisions involved in a ship class
initiation are the result of high-level tradeoffs in the political arena.
This situation is aggravated by an organizational parochialism within
the Navy. There is almost no focus at any design level on the ultimate
product -- only on individual functions at hand. The lack of communications
between planning and design staffs result in arbitrary, non-justifiable
decisions driving a design. There is often a lack of understanding of
objectives and design impacts,. and a complete absence of design continuity
between projects. Ship programs are viewed most often as "something to be
gotten over with as quickly as possible," with success being measured in
terms of ability to get a design into the water rather than being based
upon ultimate ship performance in battle scenarios, Ship production has
become largely an administrative, rather than a design exercise.
In August of 1975 a former Litton designer published a fairly scathing
attack on the role of the Navy and Litton Industries in the DD-963 design
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project. Although fairly specific charges of dishonesty in naval systems
analysis were made in a widely read naval professional publication (the
U,. S, Naval Institute Proceedings), the article elicited no direct response
on its primary theme (a fact lamented by the author in a letter published
six months later). The charges may have been irrefutable, but more likely
no one in the Navy or Litton really cared, The contract had been let, the
ships were being produced, the DD-963 decisionmakers in OPNAV had moved on,
and the entire design project considered ancient history.
An overview of the ship design organization tends to lead one to believe
that the institution of fairly simple changes in DON managerial practices
could provide much greater efficiency in the design and development process.
On the surface of the problem this seems to be a credible assumption. But
such a simplistic approach ignores many of the prime motivating factors
that maintain the system intact. Although most people in the design process
recognize the basic problems, there are strong pressures in the Department
of the Navy - unrelated to the actual design objectives -- that continue
to inhibit change.
The ostensible mission of the entire ship design and development
process is to turn out optimum platforms for the fleet. There have been
only two ship development programs in recent history (Polaris and Aegis)
in which even one individual has been able to provide some personal identi-
fication with the ultimate program objective. The vast majority of DON
personnel are involved in only tiny facets of the overall process, and are
afforded the opportunity to make few if any design impact decisions.
It has been observed that DON planning personnel fall basically into
"high level" and "low level" categories.174  The "high level" officers deal
only with broad and theoretical evaluations of force concepts. Although
platforms and combat systems are finite in number,.they tend to be addressed
only in the abstract. The "low level" officers focus narrowly on minor
systems and components as individual units. There is no consideration of
operational employment in conjunction with other systems and projects. As
a result, few is any individuals see the entire ship system -- in terms of
a hardware product - as the ultimate objective of the design and develop-
ment effort.
In the absence of clearly defined mission objectives, the primary
focus of most DON personnel has shifted to that of personal career enhance-
ment. The vast numbers of senior naval personnel in the various OPNAV offices
provide the prime arena for "front-runners" seeking high-level sponsorship
to the top.
In this atmosphere of personal contact and competition, the established
organization of OPNAV command relationships has evolved into a network of
personal contacts in which the actual development work is carried out. Jobs
tend to take on a distinctively individual flavor, with each new officer
launching into pet projects that usually die out as soon as he is relieved.
Total combat system and platform development time generally spans at
least a 14 year period, yet average officer tour lengths in OPNAV run between
two and three years. Thus every OPNAV office sees a complete personnel turn-
over at least 5 times in the design and development of a total ship system.
With each new decisionmaker interjecting his own subjective or intuitive
design inputs - seldom with written documentation - ship design require-
ments are almost always in a state of flux. The ultimate output is much
like a game of roulette, with the final combat system suite being dependent
upon the time that the design "freeze" is invoked (generally when production
funding is obtained).
Without spending time in the OPNAV offices it is impossible to compre-
hend the extent to which actual functions have become divorced from billet
titles, and the extent that project coordination depends on individual person-
alities. It is not readily apparent, even to those working in OPNAV, exactly
who is responsible for exactly what. A query about some aspect of a project's
development invariably results in a series of phone calls to try and identify
the individual, not the billet, that is handling that particular area. The
entire administrative structure is fairly fluid, with responsibilities float-
ing about as officers come and go. The billet turnover process has been
characterized as very poor (resulting in project inconsistency), but this is
a natural development of an assignment of responsibility that does not clearly
follow organizational lines.
Without a doubt, the bureaucratic structure of the organization goes a
long way in explaining the nature of the system outputs and the resistance
to change. The system as it exists serves the primary needs of those officers
that drive it.
There is a pervading feeling that all of the analysis done in defining
specific ship requirements is little more than a waste of time. Actual
decisionmaking is perceived as an intuitive process conducted strictly "at
the top". There is generally no personal identification with ship character-
istics below the flag officer level, Those individuals who do work their
way into positions where they can make design inputs or changes seem to feel
the obligation to do so -- regardless of whether quantitative analysis is
available to guide their decisions. No officer will readily admit that his
own personal experiences are not adequate to qualify him to make subjective
performance decisions. An example was offered of the effort that went into
cost/performance analyses to prove the utility of limited NTDS and helo
haul-down systems for the FFG-7 modernization. A new OP-03 division head
almost cut the programs with the stroke of a pen and the subjective evaluation
that the added capability wasn't worth the expense. 'He had once been command-
ing officer of a destroyer and had operated just fine without those things.
For the officers who had done the extensive cost/benefit analysis it all
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seemed like one big exercise.
Certainly the size of staffs involved in ship development contribute
to the lack of mission orientation and the focus on extraneous goals. Senior
commanders coming ashore from individual command of hundreds of men and ships
worth hundreds of millions of dollars are dropped into crowded cubicles as
one among many in relatively junior Pentagon positions. They are so far
removed from the decisionmaking process (even trivial decisions compared
with those made by an operational commanding officer) and the corporate
reward system that they have little motivation even to investigate overall
project missions. At every level, the majority of individual effort seems
to center on responding to budgetary questions or challenges from above,
than to pursuing actively innovative research and analysis.
Even outside of the Department of the Navy there is no great desire
expressed for system change. The limitations and problems at each level are
largely understood, but interested factions - OSD, Congress, the Executive
- are reluctant to decry the subjective nature of ship requirements deriva-
tion for fear of having to assume a greater measure of responsibility for
product performance themselves, Although such an approach may not be con-
sciously made, there are certainly enough agencies and personnel involved in
the ship development process to disperse the blame when things go wrong and
to accept responsibility when things go right,
Although the limitations of the current structure of the design and
development process within the Department of the Navy are well understood
by most Navy offices, parochialism to the lowest level has resulted in con-
tinuous finger-pointing and fault-finding rather than real efforts to over-
come the difficulties.
NAVSEA designers complain of lack of requirement justification from
OP-03; OP-96 complains of lack of technical design information from combat
systems designers; combat systems designers complain of lack of performance
feedback or design direction from OPNAV; etc. Little effort appears to be
expended by individuals to go out and find solutions to their problems.
Communications failure is even a major problem within individual staffs,
with officers often not knowing what a man in the next office is working on.
NAVSEA underwent a recent organizational change that moved various design
activities within their Crystal City building complex. Telephones are seldom
utilized for the discussion of engineering specifications, and so the move-
ment of design offices to different building floors in some cases caused a
complete severing of personal contact between designers.
Such design contraints as bureaucratic inertia, outside influence, and
lack of quantitative performance measures might not be solved by a central
project focus, but certainly a widespread understanding of program objectives
could help to put such problems in perspective and improve overall design
effectiveness in the Department of the Navy, With almost every office on
DON producing a different picture of what the Navy needs it is not surprising
that OSD, the Executive, and Congress feel no compunction about making their
own program decisions and modifications.
Admiral Zumwalt pointed out that "... it can truly be said that no
single person in the Navy really has control over even the highest priority
,,176or clear-cut program efforts. Most Navy officials point to the fact
that there is no one individual in charge of an entire shipbuilding program
as the crux of the development problems, One NAVSEA designer put the feeling
this way:
What means do we have for the ship designer to be
personally identified with the project? I think of the
Messerschmitt airplane, and I know who's responsible. I
think of the FFG-7 and I'm not sure. Where in the system
is the reward for excellence and the penalty for failure?
It seems that we can design poor ships and no one pays a
price. It seems that if we design a good ship no one 177
gets any credit. I think that's a serious deficiency,
It is widely agreed in most DON offices that what is needed to provide
consistently good platforms is something of a shipbuilding "czar" to take
responsibility for each class. The rationale is that such an organization
would force one individual and one central office to focus solely on the
objective of producing the best platform for the money. It would be able
to prioritize and balance the various opposing interests to prevent inconse-
quential or arbitrary decisions from driving the design. Ship classes that
are pointed to as successful products of such development organizations are
the Polaris SSBN under Rear Admiral William F. Raborn, and the Aegis CG-47
under Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer,
Certainly individual responsibility in those cases was largely respon-
sible for successful program development. Projects go nowhere in the Navy
without active, continuous, and influential sponsors. In each case a pro-
gram must be "sold" to authorization and funding activities, and it takes a
powerful hand to keep projects from drifting off track.
Rear Admiral Meyer's success with Aegis has been his ability to outlast
his competition. He has remained with the program virtually since its incep-
tion, and has steadily moved up through the ranks in it, molding it to his
own ideas, as his opponents and competitors were transferred or retired.
To OPNAV and NAVSEA officers involved with the project, the Aegis program
is Wayne Meyer. It is considered something of a "religion" to him and his
staff - and he preaches it as such every chance that he gets. One civilian
Aegis staff member likened Rear Admiral Meyer to a "bible-belt preacher -
he makes you believe in it." 1 7 8 At the Aegis/CG-47 design offices in Crystal
City there is no question as to what project is developing or what the
objective is. The word "Aegis" is painted or posted in every passageway
and there is a great sense of urgency that seems to drive all activity.
To be sure, Rear Admiral Meyer has played a major role in marshalling
efforts to get the Aegis program to sea. But the contention that such a
brand of program management could make anp ship development project a success
is highly questionable. The Polaris and Aegis programs are unique in the
history of ship development as virtually pure "topside down" designs, Both
were well-defined combat systems looking for a platform to take them to sea.
For the Polaris, this involved the lengthening of a conventional SSN hull -
for the Aegis, this involved squeezing the combat system onto a standard
Spruance platform, In both cases the program manager took a part in determin-
ing system configuration and major performance characteristics - but only
from the viewpoint of technical feasibility, not operational need. The
only major operational decision in the Polaris program was how many missiles
to place in each boat -- a question resolved largely by arbitrary selection.
The Aegis program basically took a Spruance combat systems suite "as is" -
retaining the two MK-45 5"/54 mounts, ASROC, LAMPS, torpedoes, etc. - and
making only electronic equipment changes and structural modifications to
accommodate the Aegis system. In neither case, Polaris or Aegis, were any
cost/performance tradeoffs done to determine marginal utility of system
capability. Both were high-mix platforms in which a desire to possess the
combat system capability overrode most costing considerations. Few other
ship classes have been so open-ended.
The identification and assignment of a project "czar" to a given program
is an unresolved problem. Rear Admiral Meyer was not so much selected to
head Aegis in its early stages as he personally managed to cling to the pro-
gram on its way up (if he had had the misfortune to hang his star on the SCS,
SES, or any other defunct project he would probably be retired by now). It
is a unique individual who is prepared to sacrifice his career for a high-
risk program that he believes in, and it is questionable as to how many
other "topside down" warships built around a highly defined combat system
will be developed. Since the tools and organization are not available to
identify clearly an optimal combat suite made up of disparate subsystems,
it is not easy to see how a project manager could attach himself to such a
platform with unswerving devotion. The Aegis program simply involved putting
the combat system package to sea, not a decision of major iterations among
a number of subsystems. At any rate, of all of the platforms that are pro-
posed only a small number are actually built -- and the production decision
is one that is usually made after basic combat suite determination.
Assigning a "czar" to each new platform proposal is probably not going
to ensure any greater degree of subsystem justification or any greater
number of platforms constructed, An overall program manager - assigned
for the life of the program can facilitate the management project of
getting a platform to sea, but it is unlikely, without basic organizational
changes at much lower levels, that such a position would result in any
greater platform optimization. An overall program "czar" is desirable to
provide project focus and serve as a central justification office for all
development decisions, but other changes are needed to more effectively
carry out the design and development process.
An area of combat systems development that is often looked to as a
possible model for ship acquisition is that of the procurement of military
aircraft. But in terms of mission identification, performance evaluation,
and ability to utilize competitive development and design processes there
exists a vast difference between ship and aircraft acquisition programs.
As a tightly constrained combat system, aircraft performance require-
ments are relatively easy to delineate (i.e. some combination of being able
to fly higher, faster, be more maneuverable, and carry a heavier payload
than enemy aircraft). Most of these parameters are easily measurable, and
aircraft are used in combat on enough occasions to determine operational
capabilities. The 'relatively low design and production costs of aircraft
make it easier to foster industrial competition and purchase under a "fly-
before-buy" doctrine.
None of these factors are similar for ship procurement. Outside of
prolonged full-scale combat there exist no adequate measures of effective-
ness or testing process for a total ship system. Providing funds for
several contractors to tool up and produce different models is not feasible
in terms of the costs involved.
It has been suggested that the fostering of greater design competition
within the Navy could produce a better product, But the Navy is still
faced with the basic problem of determining selection criteria based on
performance, and the acquisition organization provides for no one individual
or office to make the final selection determination. With the continued
inability to measure performance of a paper design, and a personal reward
to designers only for design acceptance - not product performance - it
is doubtful that such competition would cause a departure of the decision-
making process from the political arena,
In summary, the current ship design process is a tremendous, unwieldy
organization that has no capacity for generating performance optimized plat-
forms. Tremendous amounts of money, effort, and time are expended by the
Navy to delineate ship performance requirements -- parameters that are
invariably overruled by subjective and arbitrary inputs, There is no
structural provision in the Department of the Navy for one individual to take
charge of the design and development process and initiate a major system
alteration. Operational command functions pass directly through the naval
hierarchy to the Secretary of Defense. The CNO has largely taken over the
lobbying and political role of the Secretary of the Navy (although remaining
nominally in charge of all Navy functions), and the Office of the Secretary
of the Navy has evolved into little more than that of a figurehead position.
The development of so many power centers and spheres of influence have largely
eliminated the capacity of the Department of the Navy to contract its own
size and functions down to manageable levels.
Despite these severe structural limitations both within, and outside of
the Department of the Navy, it is nevertheless possible to identify a number
of areas which can and should be addressed to bring greater efficiency to
the ship design process. The following areas are ones which need to be
addressed if a move toward platform optimization is to be achieved:
- The development of a consolidated, long-range planning capability
to project, as accurately as possible, future naval requirements. This
should take the form of one major continuing effort rather than an endless
series of short, redundant studies. The limitations of dependence on one
set of subjective inputs being understood, it is far better that naval
development programs be given some definitive direction rather than being
allowed to drift aimlessly, subject to numerous disparate pressures.
-- The development of a solid communications link throughout the planning
and design chains of command - preferably by rotation of officers through
billets from technical facilities, to systems analysis groups, to require-
ments determination offices, to Congressional/OSD liaison, and to design
offices. This should occur in conjunction with the establishment of a basic
organizational framework to bring all of the activities involved in ship
design into a viable development chain so that a true project focus can be
realized. At a minimum, this might enable combat systems designers to better
optimize their systems to the most critical constraints (eg. cost, manning,
weight, etc.).
- The placement of primary emphasis on Tac D&E and OT&E as the pre-
eminent functions of fleet operations, This should be followed by the develop-
ment of communications networks and support facilities to identify clearly
definable inter-and intratype tactics for use in operational scenarios for
combat systems and platform development. This should also spur identification
of tactical limitations and the development of alternate means of performance
qualification.
- The integration and focus of systems analysis activities on providing
solid input into the ship development process. Ideally this would lead to
the development of standard measures of effectiveness for valid cost/perform-
ance tradeoffs. A critical appraisal of systems analysis activities, par-
ticularly civilian contract agencies, should be made to determine their cost-
effectiveness to the Navy. Those that are not providing a justifiable input
into the development process should be severed from Navy contracts.
- A strict appraisal made of the number of personnel involved in planning
activities in the Department of the Navy. If the primary subjective decisions
are most effectively made by a small number of individuals, then superfluous
groups should be cut out of the design and development process.
- The development of an administrative procedure to document clearly
all design decisions and decision rationale. This would hopefully lead
to a minimizing of the imposition of arbitrary and undocumented design
constraints.
- The development of feedback channels from fleet operators back through
OT&E, OPNAV, and ship and combat systems designers to provide some preliminary
focus to the evaluation of fleet needs., This should be done in conjunction
with. wider evaluation of foreign combat systems to provide a much broader
base for alternate configuration decisions.
-- A reevaluation of the relative value of basic and arbitrary contraints
on ship design such as excessive habitability standards,
- Increased efforts made to encourage a total defense approach to naval
mission performance. There should exist no concepts of naval development
which are considered anathema, sacrosanct, or otherwise inelgible for cost/
benefit analysis. Ignoring challenges to the future of surface ships, air-
craft carriers, and an all-nuclear submarine fleet does not make such chal-
lenges go away, and indeed increases the likelihood that necessary naval
capabilities might be arbitrarily cut off by outside agencies.
- A service-wide recognition of what can and cannot be quantitatively
accomplished through the current planning and design organizations, Navy
documents and spokesmen continue to propagate the myth that combat platforms
are designed exclusively through the use of quantitative systems analysis.
Although individuals don't see this in their own offices, they tend to content
themselves with the belief that it is being done somewhere else. A common
recognition and expression of the fact that it is really done nowhere would
provide a much more realistic atmosphere in which to carry out the ship
design process.
Obviously the major roadblocks to change in the ship design process
emanate from the Navy itself, The system as it exists serves the individual
interests of those involved in the organization, and there is a natural
inertia that prohibits movement to a system that might not. It can also be
argued that constraints outside of the Department of the Navy will still act
to negate any effects of system reorganization, This contention might well
be true, but under the current method of doing business tremendous amounts
of money, material, and manpower continue to be expended in churning out
multi-billion dollar projects of often dubious value. The system as it
exists is just not responsive to the true operational needs of the fleet -
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whatever those needs can be determined to be,
It is necessary in the overall picture to determine exactly what our
design and development limitations are, to establish fleet needs as well as
possible, and to design combat platforms which represent the best possible
performance characteristics within cost and manning constraints. As one
former NAVSEC designer put it, "We could go a long way in improving the
way that we build ships, it's just that no one has ever really tried, 1 79
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Appendix I, Spruance, Perry, and Ticonderoga Class Design Specifications
DD,963
Spruance
Commissioned
Displacement (tons)
Length (ft)
Speed (kts)
Complement
Armament
Electonics A/S Radar
S/S Radar
FCS
Sonar
Passive Sonar
Elex Warfare
Range (NM/kts)
Propulsion
Shaft Horsepower
1975
8010
560
30+
296
1 Sea Sparrow
Lchr
ASROC Lchr
2 MK-45 5"/54
Harpoon SSM
*Phalanx
MK-32 Torpedo
Tubes
*2 LAMPS III
MK-36 RBOC
NTDS
SPS-40
SPS-55
MK-86 (SPQ-9/
SPG-60)
SQS-53
SLQ-32
6000/20
4 LM-2500
Gas Turbine
80,000
FFG-7
Perry
1977
3537
439
28
185
1 MK-13 SM-1
Lchr
1 76mm OTO
Harpoon SSM
*Phalanx
MK-32 Torpedo
Tubes
*2 LAMPS III
MK-36 RBOC
*NTDS
SPS-49
SPS-55
MK-92
SQS-56
*SQR-19 (TACTAS)
SLQ-32
5000/18
2 LM-2500
Gas Turbine
40,000
CG-47
Ticonderoga
(1982)
9055
560
30+
320
2 MK-26 SM-2
Lchrs
ASROC Lchr
2 MK-45 5"/54
Harpoon SSM
Phalanx
MK-32 Torpedo
Tubes
2 LAMPS III
MK-36 RBOC
NTDS
SPS-49
SPS-55
MK-86 (SPQ-9)
Aegis (SPY-1)
SQS-53
SQR-19 (TACTAS)
SLQ-32
6000/20
4 LM-2500
Gas Turbine
80,000
*-planned modification
A/S - air search
S/S - surface search
FCS - fire control system
Lchr - launcher
RBOC - Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff
NTDS - Naval Tactical Data System
LAMPS - Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System
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Appendix II, Escort Classes Constructed 1960 to 1980
Laid Down Lead Ship Number in Class
Cruisers 1962 CG-26 Belknap 9
1963 CGN-35 Truxton 1
1970 CGN-36 California 2
1972 CGN-38 Virginia 4
Destroyers 1972 DD-963 Spruance 30
Frigates 1961 FF-1037 Bronstein 2
1962 FF-1040 Garcia 10
1962 FFG-l Brooke 6
1965 FF-1052 Knox 46
1975 FFG-7 Perry 75 (?)
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Appendix III. Glossary
AAW - Anti-Air Warfare
ABL - Allocated Baseline
ACV - Air-Cushion Vehicle
ANV - Advanced Naval Vehicle
ASMS - Advanced Surface Missile System
ASROC - Anti-Submarine Rocket
ASW - Anti-Submarine Warfare
BPDMS - Basic Point Defense Missile System
BUMED - Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
CBL - Conceptual Baseline
CEB - CNO Executive Board
CF/CD - Concept Formulation/Contract Definition
CIC - Combat Information Center
CNA - Center for Naval Analysis
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
CODAG - Combination Diesel and Gas
COMOPTEVFOR - Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
CPAM - CNO Program Analysis Memorandum
CPPG - CNO Program Planning Guidance
DCP - Decision Coordinating Paper
DDR&E - OSD Office of Research and Engineering
DNSARC - DON Systems Acquisition Review Council
DOD - Department of Defense
DON - Department of the Navy
DP - Development Proposal
DPPG - Defense Policy and Planning Guidance
DSARC - Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DTC - Design-to-Cost
EPA - Extended Planning Annex
FBL - Functional Baseline
FYDP - Five Year Defense Program
GAO - Government Accounting Office
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IFF - Identification, Friend or Foe
INS - Institute for Naval Studies (CNA)
ISSM - Interim Surface-to-Surface Missile
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
KW - Kilowatt
LAMPS - Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System
MENS - Mission Element Need Statement
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVMAT - Naval Material Command
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSEC - Naval Ship Engineering Center
NAVWAG - Naval Warfare Analysis Group (CNA)
NDCP - Navy Decision Coordinating Paper
NSC - National Security Council
NWP - Naval Warfare Publication
OEG - Operations Evaluation Group (CNA)
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
OPNAV - Office of the CNO
OPTEVFOR - Operational Test and Evaluation Force
OP-OOX - CNO Long Range Planning Group
OP-02 - Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare
OP-03 - Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare
OP-32 - Surface Warfare Division (OP-03)
OP-35 - Surface Combat Systems Division (OP-03)
OP-37 - Ship Acquisition and Amphibious, MLSF, Mine, and Special Warfare
Division (OP-.03)
OP-05 - Deputy CNO for Air Warfare
OP-06 - Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations
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OP-96 - Systems Analysis and Long Range Objectives Division
OP-965 - Extended Planning Branch (0P-96)
OP-97 - Office of Ship Acquisition and Improvement
OP-098 - Director, RDT&E
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OP-983 - T&E Division
OR - Operational Requirement
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSN - Office of the Secretary of the Navy
PA&E - DOD Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
POM - Program Objective Memorandum
R&D - Research and Development
RDT&E - Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RFP - Request for Proposal
SECDEF - Secretary of Defense
SECNAV - Secretary of the Navy
SES - Surface Effect Ship
SHAP - Ship Acquisition Plan
SHAPM - Ship Acquisition Program Manager
SUW - Anti-Surface Warfare
SWATH - Small Water-Plane Area Twin Hull
SWO - Surface Warfare Officer
SWP - Surface Warfare Plan
TAC D&E - Tactical Development and Evaluation
TAO - Tactical Action Officer
TEMP - Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TLR - Top Level Requirement
TLS - Top Level Specifications
TPP - Total Package Procurement
TOR - Tactical Operational Requirements
VSTOL - Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (Aircraft)
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